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**PRACTICE
IMPROVEMENT**

PRACTICE ADVICE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIORITY AND VOLUME CRIME

(The Volume Crime Management Model)

Second Edition

2009

Produced on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers
by the National Policing Improvement Agency

This practice advice contains information to assist policing in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

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**PRACTICE ADVICE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIORITY AND VOLUME CRIME
(The Volume Crime Management Model) Second Edition.**

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PREFACE

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) commissioned the National Centre for Policing Excellence (NCPE), in September 2003, to research and identify the critical issues for effective volume crime management. Practice Advice for the Management of Volume Crime, which recommended a number of principles and practices was published in May 2004. These were collectively referred to as the Volume Crime Management Model (VCMM), which was piloted in four geographical Basic Command Units (BCUs) between April 2004 and March 2005.

During the pilot, the model was interpreted in accordance with local practices, priorities and the dynamics of different policing environments. The pilot sites received regular thematic visits from NCPE staff and an independent evaluation team.

Throughout the pilot phase a number of other BCUs adopted the model, working closely with the NCPE and the pilot sites. Although these were not subject to the evaluation regime, they did provide further insight into the practical application of the model.

This practice advice will assist BCU commanders and crime managers to assess the effectiveness of their current practices and to implement any changes, where necessary, to volume crime management regimes. It draws on the original research, the interim practice advice and the lessons learned throughout the pilot phase.

The VCMM should be considered in conjunction with the contents of the **ACPO Acquisitive and Volume Crime Site** (see **Appendix 14**), the Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) and:

- **ACPO (2005) Practice Advice on Core Investigative Doctrine;**
- **ACPO (2005) Guidance on the National Intelligence Model.**

The appendices give examples of material used by forces during the VCMM pilot. Consequently, some of the details or terms used are specific to the originating force and may not be familiar to everyone. It is anticipated, however, that the general principles will be of value to illustrate specific points, and that all the material can be easily amended and adapted.

Section 1

INTRODUCING THE VOLUME CRIME MANAGEMENT MODEL

This section defines volume crime and describes how the Volume Crime Management Model (VCMM) can be applied to any operational policing environment. It introduces the components of the VCMM and illustrates the roles and procedures which make it work.

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1.1 THE AIM OF THE VCMM

The VCMM has been designed to improve performance by managing the investigation of volume crimes, and ensuring that all police staff are fully aware of what is expected of them. This is achieved through standard administrative procedures supported by effective supervision.

1.2 WHAT IS THE VCMM?

The VCMM is a set of standards, practices and policies that builds on existing activities. It relies on the National Intelligence Model (NIM) products to determine its delivery by identifying priorities and the tactical deployment of resources. It is not a prescriptive process which operates in isolation, but is compatible with Neighbourhood Policing and can assist in tackling local issues and problem solving. The VCMM is applied through the acceptance of minimum standards. It is enforced by key roles such as principal screener and evidence review officers, and procedures that are incorporated within an overarching structure. The VCMM defines structures and processes that can be applied in the management of volume crime. It is not, however, intended to provide tactical menus to address various crime types.

1.3 DEFINING VOLUME CRIME

Volume crime for the purpose of the VCMM is any crime which, through its sheer volume, has a significant impact on the community and the ability of the local police to tackle it. Volume crime often includes priority crimes such as street robbery, burglary and vehicle-related criminality, but can also apply to criminal damage or assaults. The VCMM can be further adapted to assist in tackling non-crime issues such as anti-social behaviour.

1.4 WHY THE VCMM IS NEEDED

The Police Service in the UK has an excellent reputation for investigating serious crimes. This is not the case, however, for volume crime, where, despite impressive reduction rates, the performance of the Police Service in solving this type of crime is perceived by many as being inadequate. For example:

- **Jansson, K. (2005) *Volume crime investigations: a review of the research literature*** stated that '...the detection rate of volume crimes remains particularly low in comparison to overall detection rates.'
- **House of Commons 696 (2005-06) Home Office: Reducing vehicle crime** stated that 'Police detection rates for vehicle crimes are too low, with only 6 % of thefts from vehicles and 13 % of thefts of vehicles being resolved.'
- **Criminal Justice System (CJS) (2002) *Narrowing the Justice Gap*** stated that 'Only a fifth of crimes recorded by the police result in their perpetrator being brought to justice. We can and must do better.'

Examination of these reports and other similar documents, together with observation throughout the VCMM pilot, revealed the following common factors which have an adverse impact on performance when investigating volume crime:

- Random response;
- Lack of clarity as to when the investigation process begins;
- Lack of continuity throughout the investigation;
- Confused lines of command;
- Limited and/or inadequate training;
- Inexperienced investigators;
- Excessive workload;
- Lack of managerial support;
- Lack of a performance regime;
- No clear investigative direction given to officers.

Traditionally, the emphasis has been on administration and the assumption that individuals and their departments, teams or units will carry out the necessary work. This has been aggravated by a tendency to treat each crime as a separate entity.

If performance is to be improved, there is a need to manage the way in which volume crime is tackled, particularly with reference to clarity of role, accountability and output. This should result in increases in sanctioned detections, effective targeting of prolific offenders, improved problem solving and public reassurance.

1.5 IS THE VCMM COMPATIBLE WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES?

The VCMM can be adapted in accordance with any BCU or force management process. It is particularly compatible with Neighbourhood Policing and Workforce Modernisation because it determines bespoke action and minimum standards for everybody concerned in tackling specific problems. The strength of the VCMM is that even those individuals who have hitherto been regarded as peripheral to an incident, eg, call handlers and enquiry officers, are acknowledged for the part they can play, and can be directed accordingly.

In addition to being a process for managing volume crime, the VCMM can also be used for problem solving within volume crime. Efficient administrative processes will ensure that problem profiles, hot spots and the targeting of prolific and priority offenders will be used effectively to drive collaborative problem solving. This will lead to sustainable solutions for community-based persistent crime problems. Such activities, however, should be undertaken in accordance with NIM.

1.6 HOW DOES THE VCMM WORK?

The first step is to define the volume crime or crimes that the VCMM will apply to, as identified in the control strategy determined by the strategic assessment. The tactical assessment and subsequent Tasking and Coordination Group (TCG) will decide how those offences, designated as volume crimes, will be tackled. This will ensure sufficient flexibility to allow BCU commanders to use the VCMM in accordance with their priorities. For example, the model can be applied to all crimes as a generic crime management model or can be restricted to particular crime types, trends and locations.

When the approach to tackling volume crime has been determined, the VCMM can then be applied through the following components:

- Call handling and initial investigation;
- Primary investigation and crime recording;
- Crime management and administration;
- Secondary investigation;
- Suspect management.

Although these components should be part of a single process rather than being separate entities working in isolation, it is necessary for each one to have specific procedures and roles for tackling volume crime. This will provide clarity and operational stability, as individuals are more likely to be effective when they are fully informed about the objectives and methods of operation, and about their roles and responsibilities. The expected outcomes will be effective action at key points in the investigation process, along with fast-time response involving the minimum number of resources.

Figure 1 details how the components of the VCMM are determined by NIM. The offence of burglary is used as an example to demonstrate how NIM processes determine the tactical outputs of the VCMM.

Figure 1 The Relationship Between the VCMM and NIM





Figure 2 illustrates the key processes and roles incorporated within the components of the VCMM. These are discussed in the relevant sections of this practice advice. Specimen documents are included in the appendices.

Figure 2 The VCMM Process



1.7 SUMMARY OF THE VCMM PILOT

Between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005, the VCMM was piloted in four BCUs. Each of the pilot sites defined and implemented the model in different ways. Some concentrated on priority crimes, eg, street robbery, burglary, vehicle crime, while others applied it exclusively to tackle high-volume crimes, eg, criminal damage and assaults.

Some sites used it as an opportunity to set standards for all crime investigations while others restricted the model to specified crimes only. The most striking difference, however, was the contrast between the sites which used dedicated resources to undertake specific functions and those which maintained a generalist approach. The former were able to target and develop the skills of a few individuals to certain tasks, while the latter aspired to raise the standards of the majority of the workforce.

All pilot sites saw improvements in overall detection rates and substantial reductions in some key volume crime categories, particularly in the areas of vehicle crime and domestic burglary.

There was also an improvement in the quality of crime reports, particularly the detailing of modus operandi (MO) and the production of auditable records of action taken and evidence gathered. Three sites made significant improvements in tackling volume crime when compared with other BCUs in the same force and their family of BCUs. A summary of performance figures is shown in **Table 1**, **Table 2** and **Table 3**.

Table 1 Performance Comparison Chart

Performance Indicators (targets)	Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Non Pilot BCU	Force
Domestic burglary											
Domestic burglary detections											
Robbery											
Robbery detections											
Vehicle crime											
Vehicle crime detections											
Notifiable offence sanction detections											
Sanction detections contribution to Offences Brought To Justice (OBTJ)											

This chart compares the performance of a VCM pilot BCU with other BCUs within the same force for the period 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005. The categories shown in green are where a target has been exceeded, those in amber depict where a target has simply been achieved and those in red detail a failure to meet the target.

Table 2 Priority Offences Chart

	Burglary			Theft of MV			Theft from MV		
	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change
Apr	658	491	-167	198	202	4	471	351	-120
May	711	522	-189	235	195	-40	504	410	-94
Jun	715	431	-284	190	216	26	382	351	-31
Jul	567	329	-238	266	186	-80	486	241	-245
Aug	549	339	-210	167	130	-37	415	280	-135
Sep	493	445	-48	198	164	-34	498	304	-194
Oct	558	444	-114	254	158	-96	457	399	-58
Nov	612	453	-159	214	149	-65	370	353	-17
Dec	586	383	-203	172	148	-24	402	296	-106
Jan	625	326	-299	253	169	-84	389	340	-49
Feb	518	287	-231	225	157	-68	398	327	-71
Mar	506	303	-203	215	154	-61	360	313	-47
Year to Date	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Change
	7098	3837	-3261	2587	2028	-559	5132	3965	-1167

This table details the number of priority offences occurring within a VCMM pilot BCU throughout the pilot year in comparison with the previous year.

Table 3 Priority Offence Detections

Detection Rate			
	Previous Year	Pilot Year	Improvement
Total Crime	16.2%	22.5%	+ 6.3%
Burglary Dwelling	10.1%	13.3%	+ 3.2%
Vehicle Crime	6.85%	9.35%	+ 2.5%

This table compares the priority offences detection rates within a VCMM pilot BCU at the end of the pilot year.

Recommendation 1

The implementation of the VCMM through standard administrative procedures.

Section 2

CALL HANDLING

This section discusses the significant role that call handling plays in the VCMM and describes good practice identified and developed during the pilot phase. Although call handling is dealt with by forces, in many ways the recommended processes can be applied to any setting.

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2.1 DEFINITION OF CALL HANDLING

The VCMM regards call handling as commencing when the Police Service receives a telephone call from someone reporting a crime that has occurred or is in progress. The process is completed when a resource is deployed or the call is passed on to another department tasked to deal with it, eg, a crime recording bureau. This definition also applies when the public report such matters in person to the reception staff at police stations.

2.2 CALL HANDLING AND INVESTIGATION

The initial contact between victims or witnesses with the Police Service is a key component of the VCMM. It should be regarded as the start of the investigation process and is when a wealth of information and intelligence can be available. The call is an opportunity to obtain accurate and relevant information, collect evidence, ascertain if a crime has occurred and give reassurance and guidance to the caller, eg, about the preservation of forensic evidence. This process can be enhanced by the use of scripts, drop-down menus and other prompts to assist call handlers in dealing with initial reports of volume crime. Examples of these, together with bespoke training packages, can be found on the **ACPO Acquisitive and Volume Crime Site**. An access guide to the site can be found in **Appendix 14**. The introduction of the Single Non-Emergency Numbers (SNEN) in 2008 may show an increase in the amount of volume crime reported by telephone. This reinforces the need to have systems in place to ensure that every opportunity is taken to capture additional material and provide a quality service to callers.

2.3 CALL HANDLING AND SCREENING

Although crime screening is often considered as a process which occurs after a crime has been recorded, it is the call handlers who actually determine the response to a crime at the point of initial report. On taking a call, the handler must decide whether it warrants the deployment of a response unit, referral to a crime recording bureau or if it should be recorded as an incident requiring no further action.

Edwards, P. (2006) Redefining Screening states that:

- Every report of a crime should receive a minimum level of investigation at the outset, to ensure an informed and accurate decision is made to determine the initial response.
- Call handling should be considered as more important than an administrative function as it is essential to ensuring the beginning of the investigative process. This should be reflected in the training for all call takers, whose skills must be at PIP Level 1 as a minimum.
- National guidance is required on the minimum levels of information that call takers record to determine the initial response.
- It is essential that policies, which determine the responses to reports of crimes, are consistent but also integrated with existing strategies and initiatives by ensuring strong links between call-handling centres and operational police units.

2.4 CALL HANDLING AND DEPLOYMENT

The initial contact between a victim or witness with the Police Service usually results in a decision on what action is required to respond to that report. This could be that a resource is sent to a location, a telephone investigation is conducted, the call is passed on to another department or details are recorded by the person taking the call. These actions result in levels of deployment which are often determined by force-wide call-grading criteria. They may include drivers such as crime type and other circumstances including vulnerability, repeat victimisation and local policing priorities.

Forces may have fixed criteria which have been in place for several years but may be in direct conflict with NIM processes. On some occasions the desired response to particular crimes, as determined by the tactical assessment, is compromised by the force's call-taking and deployment criteria. Examples of this are when dedicated crime scene investigators are deployed to other (non-urgent) incidents and a mandatory response to vehicle crimes in a hot spot is ignored.

Appropriate call handling and subsequent deployment is a key aspect of the VCMM. It requires that functions performed at a force level are flexible enough to meet the needs of each BCU within that force.

2.5 NATIONAL CALL HANDLING STANDARDS

The National Call Handling Standards have been approved by the Chief Constables Council, which has recommended a tripartite approach to implementation involving the Home Office, ACPO and the Association of Police Authorities (APA). They will form part of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) for call handling, and chief officers will need to implement call handling standards in order to attain positive assessments.

The aim of the standards is to deliver a quality of service that reflects the needs of communities, thereby improving public perception of the Police Service through consistent call handling and the high quality of information made available.

It is the responsibility of each force to manage its call handling efficiently and to the satisfaction of its police authority and the communities it serves. Deviations from nationally agreed standards or guidelines will result in wide disparity in the way police forces manage their calls, the priorities and grades assigned to them, and the responses given to various types of call.

The majority of calls will be resolved either at the first point of contact or by a single transfer, thereby giving the caller confidence that the call is being handled in an efficient and professional manner.

The impact that call handling has on the investigation of priority and volume crime, as discussed throughout this section, is included in *ACPO (2005) National Call Handling Standards*.

Recommendation 2

Call handling must be regarded as part of the investigative process.

Recommendation 3

Call handling and deployment criteria must be sufficiently flexible to service the needs of the BCUs.

Recommendation 4

Aides-memoire such as scripts, drop-down menus and other prompts should be used to assist call handlers in dealing with the initial investigation of volume crime.

Section 3

CRIME RECORDING AND PRIMARY INVESTIGATION

This section explains how crime reports are compiled. It focuses on what occurs immediately after the initial allegation of a crime is passed to another unit, team or individual. This is where the expectations of the victims, police officers and police staff may differ. The VCMM requires that crime recording is regarded as a primary investigation rather than a process of simply taking details.

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3.1 INVESTIGATION AND RECORDING

The importance of gathering evidence as expediently and accurately as possible should not be overlooked. For example, *Gill, M. (1996) The Crime Allocation System: Police Investigations into Burglary and Auto Crime*, established that:

The most significant contributing factor to a successful investigation is the first investigator's crime report. The quality of the actions taken and recorded bears greatly upon the successful resolution of a case.

If the initial gathering of witness details, collection of physical evidence, identification of lines of enquiry, conducting of searches and the arrest of outstanding offenders is poor, it can affect the outcome of the investigation. Not only are investigation and detection opportunities lost, but the data that drives many other functions, eg, analysis, identification of offenders or hot spots, will be inadequate.

Poor or inadequate initial and/or primary investigations are likely to have an adverse impact on the confidence that the public have in the police, and will do little to reassure the community. It is also likely that such conduct will contravene *CJS (2005) Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, and lead to failure to achieve the required standards detailed within the user satisfaction surveys carried out within the Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS). For further information on these measures, see **Appendix 12**. Concerns have also been raised by the Police Service regarding its ability to identify and manage critical incidents and take proactive steps to restore public confidence after a critical incident has been identified. For further information on critical incidents, see *ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management*.

There must be a commitment to deal with today's crime today. This means that all crimes need early assessment and real-time response in accordance with the control strategy and tactical assessment.

The VCMM does not advocate that all alleged crime scenes must be attended. On many occasions, crime reports are compiled without anyone attending the scene or meeting the victim in person. Such calls are either routinely handled within specialist bureaux or by generic call handlers, depending on the composition of the force. While practices differ greatly between forces, common themes and objectives should be established with the emphasis on obtaining information, evidence and intelligence, rather than simply recording allegations. If this is not the case, it is unlikely that the resulting crime reports will be detailed or accurate enough to enable correct assessment. Furthermore, analysis and intelligence gathering will be hampered by the lack of information.

The opportunities lost by taking crime reports over the telephone without even the minimum of investigation are often replicated when officers attend crime scenes. The VCMM pilot revealed that many officers believed their role was to record details and that another unit would be responsible for investigating the crime. This perception is frequently reinforced by busy workloads and deployment strategies.

A requirement of the VCMM is that provisions are put in place to ensure that the initial recording of a volume crime is regarded as an investigation, regardless of the role and status of the individual taking the report. This can be achieved by specialist training, eg, PIP, together with the use of investigation plans and standard minimum procedures, which should negate the need for many crimes to be passed on for further investigation.

3.2 CRIME BUREAU

Many forces have found that receiving crime allegations directly from victims over the telephone (or even by email) is an efficient use of resources and can also be convenient for the public. Crime recording is the first function along the investigative trail. Prior to calls being routed to the Crime Management Unit, various systems and policies will have already been complied with. This includes initial screening and prioritisation at the Force Communications Centre, to ensure that demand management is effective. This will determine whether the call is allocated for a response by a uniformed patrol or referred to a crime bureau where crime details will be recorded.

In the majority of cases, scripts will be used to enhance the quality of information gained from persons reporting volume crimes; they can also be used to test the validity of an allegation. See **Appendix 3** for an example of a script for call handlers.

3.3 DEDICATED CRIME RESPONSE TEAM

The use of dedicated staff to attend volume crime scenes should be considered. However, although it may not be feasible for all BCUs, particularly those which cover large geographical but sparsely populated areas, to fully adopt this approach, certain elements can be used. For example, small teams can be deployed in parts of a BCU or specific officers designated to attend particular types of crime scene.

The VCMM pilot established that the use of trained dedicated staff has the following advantages:

- An identified and available resource to be tasked for speed of investigation;
- Prompt attendance at crime scenes to ensure early police contact with victims and witnesses;
- Disciplined collection and recording of evidence;
- Freedom of role to conduct enquiries expeditiously and thoroughly;
- Ownership of (and accountability for) investigation and continuity during early stages;
- Quick-time response to intelligence.

Dedicated Crime Response Teams (DCRTs) will vary, depending on local contexts, but ideally they will be tasked (in accordance with NIM) as the first response to specific incidents or crime scenes. They must be sufficiently trained to conduct investigations, assess crime scenes and seize physical evidence. They should also offer specific crime prevention guidance.

The implementation of this element of the model may involve significant changes to staff practices, responsibilities and culture. Alternatively, this function can be performed by crime specific units (eg, burglary squad) or location specific units (eg, neighbourhood teams), depending on the nature of the crime and NIM processes. The use of such teams, however, should be more than a simple re-labelling exercise. Current practices need to be reviewed to ensure that appropriate investigations are conducted. As a result, the crime will be thoroughly investigated at the point of recording and may well be finalised on the same day.

DCRT Role

DCRT members can be tasked to attend specific incidents and crime scenes to undertake quality investigations straightaway. They should be accredited to at least PIP Level 1.

The role includes:

- Obtaining best evidence through a focused investigation conducted in a timely manner;
- Advising if any further relevant lines of enquiry are appropriate;
- Making considered decisions on the validation of allegations;
- Providing the primary response to reported offences;
- Assessing the scene's forensic value;
- Arresting suspects and completing arrest packages;
- Identifying links between crimes by visiting other scenes, and having a knowledge of the suspect's MO;
- Considering victim impact, providing support and ensuring traumatised and distressed victims are informed of other support agencies' services;
- Recognising the opportunities for crime reduction and providing practical and relevant crime prevention advice;
- Advising victims about the likely outcomes of investigations and explaining the rationale for decisions taken;
- Completing comprehensive crime reports;
- Submitting intelligence reports via 5x5x5 templates;
- Conducting house-to-house enquiries, where appropriate.

3.4 GENERALIST RESPONSE

Despite the recommendation that DCRTs should be considered, where this is not possible, the commitment of dealing with today's crime today must remain. This means that police officers or police staff attending crime scenes should do more than simply record details. There is an expectation that they will conduct comprehensive investigations, reassure the immediate community and maximise forensic opportunities. It is possible, however, that some individuals may not have the appropriate skills or motivation to do so. Every effort must, therefore, be made to support and encourage them by establishing procedures and standards which provide clear guidelines of what is expected. These can be reinforced through the use of investigation plans or aides-memoire, to supplement training and supervision. An example of a primary investigation plan can be found in **Appendix 4**.

A research study into the use of investigation plans and other prescriptive procedures in *Burrows, J. et al (2005) Understanding the attrition process in volume crime investigations* found that:

There is a fear that a reliance on procedure alone will allow little scope for flair, as officers focus on the details of a prescribed activity at the expense of the investigation. Conversely it has also been established that where operatives are allowed blanket discretion to determine their action at crime scenes there is a risk that it will be used stupidly, thoughtlessly or unethically.

These contradictory views were evident at the early stages of the pilot, but were resolved through a process in which investigation plans were used as either minimum standards or aides-memoire. For example, there was no mandate that house-to-house enquiries should be compulsory in all investigations. Instead, they were highlighted as a potential line of enquiry which officers were required to consider, recording their actions and decisions as part of the crime report. *Jones, T. and Maguire, M. (2005) Evaluation of Volume Crime Model* identified the effectiveness of this approach. They also observed that ‘...initial crime reports in all pilot sites demonstrated some considerable improvement in overall ratings over the course of the year.’

Generic investigation plans can also help a force to comply with the provisions of equality legislation, as a documented record of investigative action taken (by following a plan) should help to eradicate discrimination.

Recommendation 5

The use of Dedicated Crime Response teams (DCRTs) to respond to volume crime incidents should be considered.

Recommendation 6

All squads, units and teams tasked with investigating volume crime are incorporated in the VCMM.

Section 4

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Management and administration processes, together with effective supervision, are the essence of the VCMM. They shape the investigation of volume crime using methods similar to those employed in major investigations. This section explores procedures that in most forces are contained within single units based in each BCU. They are typically referred to as Crime Management Units (CMU) or Incident Management Units (IMU). The VCMM does not depend on the existence of such units but makes recommendations about processes and procedures which can be interpreted and applied in many ways.

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4.1 CRIME MANAGEMENT ROLES

Throughout the VCMM pilot, several BCUs established specific roles to facilitate the change from crime administration to crime management. The following descriptions contain the minimum requirements of these roles and are intended to be used as a guide rather than as definitive profiles. No reference has been made to ranks or grades as it is likely that these will be decided by force policy and processes similar to those in the Workforce Modernisation Programme.

Principal Screener – must have an oversight of all volume crime investigations to ensure that a high level of performance is achieved and maintained. The postholder should be accredited to PIP Level 2, as a minimum standard.

The role includes:

- Receiving, assessing, allocating and monitoring crimes;
- Setting clear investigative plans for specific crime reports;
- Evaluation and prioritisation of crime reports;
- Ensuring that volume crime trends, clusters and hot spots are disseminated to the Intelligence Unit and identified at the intelligence meeting;
- Acting as a single point of contact for expert advice to all officers on crime detection, recording and disposal;
- Monitoring the levels of filed and live crime reports;
- Acting as the point of contact for media referrals in relation to volume crime incidents;
- Advising on asset recovery and financial investigation.

CMU Investigator – must support the principal screener in addition to completing a number of investigative tasks which may be regarded as routine but are, nevertheless, important. In some cases they may undertake screening, depending on their knowledge of investigation. They can also reduce the workload of operational staff and provide well-informed updates to victims. The postholder should be accredited to PIP Level 1, as a minimum standard.

The role includes:

- Conducting investigations by telephone;
- Making follow-up calls to victims;
- Reviewing undetected crime for clearing opportunities;
- Updating crime reports promptly and accurately for disclosure purposes;
- Completing 5x5x5 intelligence reports;
- Liaison with Victim Support and Neighbourhood Watch;
- Validating crime reports in accordance with National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS);
- Allocating crime reports to specific personnel as directed by the unit supervisor;
- Undertaking ancillary tasks, eg, insurance company updates.

Forensic Intelligence Researcher – maximises opportunities regarding the forensic identification of suspects.

The role includes:

- Liaison with analysts, crime scene investigators and intelligence units;
- Ensuring that forensic exhibits are sent for examination;
- Updating crime reports promptly and accurately;
- Assisting with the collation and completion of 5x5x5 intelligence reports;
- Linking scenes through forensic evidence;
- Providing information on developments in forensic evidence;
- Cross-referencing crimes with outstanding forensic identifications;
- Reviewing suspects in custody, providing advice on links to other crimes, incidents and scenes.

CCTV Investigator – should be a specialist investigator able to capitalise on the proliferation of closed-circuit television (CCTV), which is rapidly becoming sophisticated and more complex, and provides the Police Service with opportunities to identify offenders of all types of crime. They ensure that such evidence is obtained in a timely fashion and is properly exhibited and presented as evidence. They also prevent operational officers from being allocated investigations simply to establish whether CCTV evidence is available. The postholder should be accredited to PIP Level 1, as a minimum standard.

The role includes:

- Maintaining a profile of all CCTV in a particular area or BCU;
- Regular liaison with CCTV operators;
- Determining whether crime incidents have occurred within the vicinity of any CCTV coverage;
- Collecting and reviewing video or digital images to determine whether or not there is any evidence, intelligence or other information which may be relevant to a police investigation;
- Retention of video and digital imagery which contains relevant material, ensuring continuity and integrity of evidence;
- Maintaining records and statistics which measure the effectiveness of CCTV surveillance;
- Coordinating activity in relation to the handling, storage and viewing of CCTV material;
- Ensuring replacement tapes are provided and the swift return of material when it is no longer required;
- Acting as adviser in more serious investigations and assuming the role of dedicated CCTV officer for serious crime, as authorised by the crime manager;
- Updating crime reports promptly and accurately for disclosure purposes;
- Completing 5x5x5 intelligence reports.

4.2 CRIME SCREENING

Crime screening is the component of the VCMM which has the most impact. It reinforces a culture of crime management rather than administration, through the following aims:

Validating allegations to ensure that crimes are correctly classified in accordance with NCRS;

- Assessing the quality of initial and primary investigation and instigating any remedial action;
- Ensuring that all evidence and intelligence gathering opportunities are exploited;
- Evaluation of the potential for detection to determine early filing or immediate referral for further investigation;
- Evaluation of other issues, eg, victim profile, to determine early filing or immediate referral for further investigation.

These aims can only be achieved by ensuring that crime screening is carried out by principal screeners who have expertise in investigation and a supervisory role. The postholder should be able to identify lines of enquiry and set investigative parameters rather than simply decide whether individual crimes should either be allocated or filed. The supervisory aspect of the crime screening role is intended to support those who supervise investigating officers, by offering expertise in the field of investigation, and providing a clear benchmark or minimum standards of investigation.

The crime screening role incorporates:


- Referring reported crimes for further research;
- Initiating remedial action regarding inadequate initial and primary investigations;
- Setting lines of enquiry and writing investigation plans;
- Deciding which crimes should be allocated for further investigation;
- Deciding which crimes should be finalised;
- Setting time parameters for an investigation;
- Reviewing and finalising completed investigations.

These functions should be conducted in accordance with NIM. For example, the control strategy will determine which volume crimes are prioritised and the tactical assessment will assist the screener in deciding how they should be allocated. A flexible crime screening system should, therefore, be in place to effectively filter and prioritise volume crime. Many forces will already have screening policies which deal with matters other than volume crime. **Appendix 5** contains an example of a generic screening matrix which incorporates the VCMM within a wider screening policy.

Once the organisational priorities have been considered, the principal screener should ensure that a volume crime is only allocated for secondary investigation when there are clear lines of enquiry to be followed. An initial assessment should be made of whether or not the crime is likely to be solved, which, in turn, should determine investigative plans and other actions. Solvability templates, which provide practitioners with a format to make consistent decisions, should be used to make the assessment. An example of a template can be found in **Appendix 6**.

The crime screening process is shown in **Figure 3**.

Figure 3 Crime Screening Process



4.3 RESEARCH

Where the emphasis is placed on crime administration rather than crime management, screeners are often required to make uninformed decisions. Sometimes crimes are allocated for investigation on the assumption that there might be a line of enquiry, eg, after viewing CCTV, or to cover deficiencies in the initial or primary investigations. Conversely, crimes which may provide intelligence-gathering opportunities, eg, the victim is a prolific offender, are simply filed.

Many of these shortfalls can be overcome if crimes are researched prior to making the final screening decision. This should assist in identifying patterns, trends and connections with target or prolific offenders. In such instances, the research function is different from that of analysis as it concentrates on quick-time and short-term dimensions which assist the decision-making process regarding screening and allocation. At a number of BCUs, researchers and principal screeners work closely with analysts. Researchers should have access to intelligence and crime-recording systems in addition to the standard search facilities on the Police National Computer (PNC), including Vehicle Online Descriptive Search (VODS).

The research function can also be part of the investigation process. For example, victims or potential witnesses can be contacted to obtain further details or to clear up any ambiguities.

4.4 ALLOCATION

The VCMM requires that prior to an allegation of a crime being allocated for secondary investigation it will have been initially investigated and rigorously screened. Whoever is tasked with the investigation will be given a plan detailing the lines of enquiry to be followed. An example of secondary investigation plans can be found in [Appendix 7](#).

Depending on the make-up of the BCU, there will be a number of individuals who will be tasked with either the entire secondary investigation or part of it. These may include:

- Dedicated volume crime investigation teams;
- Analysts;
- Telephone investigators;
- CCTV viewers;
- Patrol response teams;
- Neighbourhood Policing Teams;
- Crime reduction officers;
- Dedicated teams, eg, burglary squad.

The allocation of crimes for investigation should be part of a policy or procedure in which an individual's workload is managed in the form of a quota, or there is an agreement that the supervisors on certain units are responsible for the entire workload and that they allocate specific tasks to their staff. This was particularly effective at some of the VCMM pilot sites and is compatible with Neighbourhood Policing Teams and multi-disciplinary investigation teams introduced by the Workforce Modernisation Programme.

4.5 ANALYSIS

The use of analysis within the VCMM is in accordance with NIM and is intended to exploit all available data to identify links between crimes and possible offenders. It differs from research because it uses recognised analytical tools and products to develop an overview regarding volume crime.

Analytical resources should be available to research intelligence from crime reports and forensic identifications. This ensures that when suspects are identified any linked crimes are flagged, thereby increasing the opportunity of detecting further offences.

Some force BCUs may have a dedicated analyst to concentrate on volume crime only, and others rely on NIM processes to determine the analytical response to tackling volume crime. When considering this issue, BCU commanders should ensure that a combination of analytical techniques and products are employed to provide information for the intelligence product requirements. A multi-dimensional view of volume crime can be acquired by overlaying the results of analytical work. These include:

Crime pattern analysis – a generic term for a number of related disciplines, such as crime or incident series identification, crime trend analysis, hot spot analysis and general profile analysis.

Demographic or social trends analysis – centred on demographic changes and their impact on criminality. It also analyses social factors such as unemployment and homelessness, and considers the significance of population shifts, attitudes and activities.

Network analysis – this not only describes the links between people who form criminal networks, but also the significance of these links, the roles played by individuals and the strengths and weaknesses of a criminal organisation.

Market profiles – which are continually reviewed and updated assessments that survey the criminal market for a particular commodity, such as drugs or stolen vehicles, or of a service such as prostitution in an area.

Criminal business profiles – these contain detailed analysis of how criminal operations or techniques work, in the same way that a legitimate business might be explained.

Risk analysis – assesses the scale of risks posed by offenders or organisations to potential victims, the general public and to law enforcement agencies.

Target profile analysis – embraces a range of analytical techniques to describe the criminal, their criminal activity, lifestyle, associations, the risk they pose and their strengths and weaknesses, in order to give focus to the investigation targeting them. Profiles may also focus on victims and vulnerable persons.

Operational intelligence assessment – involves evaluating incoming intelligence to maintain the focus of an operation on previously agreed objectives, particularly in the case of a sizeable intelligence collection plan or other large-scale operation.

Results analysis – evaluates the effectiveness of law enforcement activities, for example, determining how well patrol strategies, crime reduction initiatives or a particular method of investigation works.

4.6 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

In order to drive performance regarding crime reduction and offences brought to justice, managers must have a clear understanding of volume crime trends and how to combat specific issues, using all the options provided by the VCMM.

Establishing benchmarks as a part of the operational review provides a check on performance in tackling volume crime and the effectiveness of the tactics used. The areas where benchmarks are required include:

- Number of offences brought to justice;
- Quality of crime reports;
- Turnover rate of investigations from report to finalisation;
- Number of ongoing investigations;
- Officers' workloads;
- Cases discontinued by the CPS;
- Attendance at relevant crime scenes;
- Capture of forensic and physical evidence;
- Detections by way of offences taken into consideration (TIC).

The VCMM concentrates on two broad aspects of performance management. The first of these is concerned with the performance of practitioners, to ensure that proper investigations are conducted, and the second examines management processes, to ensure that these are robust and not counterproductive. It establishes an environment which strives to improve performance by ensuring clarity of role, purpose and accountability.

An example of performance management, regarding the conduct of practitioners, is when supervisors use investigation plans as a prompt to assess an officer's investigative performance. This also includes making follow-up calls or visits to victims of crime to test the content of the crime reports and investigation logs.

Examination of management processes should concentrate on promoting those aspects which tackle volume crime effectively and the elimination of those which inhibit it. For example, if police officers are allowed to build up a backlog of investigations, it is unlikely that much progress will be made. Consequently, victims will not be updated and offences, which may have been detected, will simply drop out of the system. Some of the pilot sites set quotas of live investigations for officers (the average being eight) and held supervisors to account on a two-weekly basis. This resulted in supervisors regularly debriefing their staff, prioritising tasks and taking remedial action where necessary. Individuals were, therefore, no longer overburdened, the turnover of crime reports became more timely and the onus to take control of the process was placed on supervisors and managers.

The pilot also revealed that performance management techniques and tactics are most effective when they are part of a well-defined process. Volume crime performance should be routinely reviewed within a BCU's performance management framework and included within operational reviews, as suggested by NIM. An example of a performance review template can be found in [Appendix 12](#).

4.7 INTELLIGENCE

Those responsible for the management of volume crime can influence the intelligence function in two ways.

Firstly, they must ensure that intelligence is gathered from volume crime reports and investigations. This is particularly important when it is believed that a small number of criminals commit large numbers of offences. It is, therefore, likely that different types of offences may be linked and a prolific offender may be identified as being responsible for less serious volume crime.

Secondly, they must identify intelligence requirements aimed at tackling volume crime. This might, for example, require all patrol officers to submit intelligence reports regarding every vehicle or individual seen at a crime hot spot at specific times.

Recommendation 7

The screening and allocation of volume crime reports should be managed by principal screeners.

Recommendation 8

Principal screeners should ideally have expertise in investigation and a supervisory role.

Recommendation 9

A robust screening policy should be adopted.

Recommendation 10

Resources should be dedicated to researching volume crime in order to maximise investigative and intelligence-gathering opportunities.

Recommendation 11

Analytical products and processes should be used to tackle volume crime in accordance with NIM.

Section 5

SECONDARY INVESTIGATION

This section deals with investigative activities after the initial and primary investigations have been completed. By this stage of the VCMM, all volume crime reports should have been managed effectively through a process which has linked reporting, initial and primary investigations, screening and allocation. This should reduce the number of crimes being allocated for secondary investigation and ensure that those who are given such allocations will have clearly defined lines of enquiry.

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5.1 INVESTIGATION RESOURCES

A number of BCUs have established dedicated volume crime investigation teams as part of the VCMM. These have either been developed as an extension of the DCRT or as part of a proactive team. Similarly, crime-specific squads, eg, burglary or robbery squads, can be regarded as part of the dedicated investigative response to volume crime.

Some BCUs have been particularly innovative and used police staff to carry out CCTV viewing, conduct telephone enquiries and take statements to progress volume crime investigations, without the need to involve police officers until a suspect is identified. Others have used the Workforce Modernisation Programme to form investigation units comprising police officers and police staff.

In one BCU, the volume crime unit dealt with all volume crimes that had a named suspect. This was to facilitate a swift arrest, meet the expectations of the victim and achieve sanctioned detections without slippage. This is in keeping with the ethos of dealing with today's crime today and avoids investigations being allocated to officers with heavy workloads who are unable to treat them as a priority.

Other BCUs have linked the investigation of volume crime with the work of proactive or target offender teams. This works particularly well when a target offender is identified as being responsible for an offence which might be construed as being outside his or her usual crime type, eg, a prolific burglar caught stealing from shops or involved in an assault.

The relationship between the VCMM and dedicated units, such as robbery squads or Neighbourhood Policing Teams, has been explored by many BCUs. Consequently, a robbery squad may be allocated investigations into offences other than robbery if it is likely to assist in the arrest of an individual who is a target for the squad. Neighbourhood Policing Teams can also be allocated investigations into volume crimes, eg, criminal damage, if these offences are having a noticeable impact on their community and are considered a priority. There are, however, numerous occasions where volume crime investigations will be allocated to officers who have responsibility for other functions. Although this is an abstraction from normal duty, the impact of any disruption may be reduced by the use of investigation plans and efficient management of caseloads.

There are many ways that resources can be tasked to investigate volume crime, but these must always be undertaken in accordance with NIM.

5.2 INVESTIGATION PLANS

The VCMM requires investigation plans to be produced for all crimes allocated for secondary investigation. This is to ensure that minimum standards are maintained, and to provide investigating officers and their supervisors with guidance as to what is expected. The plans should be specific to each offence and comparable with actions allocated in major investigations. Although plans are usually written at the allocation phase, some BCUs have amended this process by tasking individual supervisors to produce plans. While this is not likely to cause any issues within dedicated investigative units, there is a concern that if supervisors who are not experienced investigators are required to perform this role it is likely that a lack of consistency will occur. Where covert tactics are considered within investigation plans, please refer to *ACPO (2008) Guidance on the Lawful and Effective Use of Covert Techniques – The Legal Framework and Covert Operational Management [Restricted]*. An example of a secondary investigation plan can be found in **Appendix 7**.

5.3 SUPERVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS

The VCMM establishes quality assurance policies to support those responsible for the supervision of officers tasked with volume crime investigations. Much of this has already been covered in **4.6 Performance Management**, however, the importance of effective supervision warrants further consideration. In *Burrows, J. et al (2005) Understanding the attrition process in volume crime investigations*, it is stated that the effectiveness of any approach to tackling volume crime ‘...turned on strong supervisory arrangements to check that procedures are followed and to coach and check appropriate use of discretion.’

Once the investigation plan has been set, regular reviews should be conducted by individual supervisors and those responsible for crime management. Time parameters must be specific to the crime and not simply provide twenty-eight day periods between updates. Desired disposal outcomes and review periods should be determined at the outset and incorporated in the investigation plan according to crime type. It is necessary to be aware at all times of the need to bring offenders to justice and to reassure victims.

5.4 PROFESSIONALISING INVESTIGATION PROGRAMME

The Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) requires investigators to be able to perform their role to an agreed national standard. The Police Service has adopted a range of National Occupational Standards (NOS), which include:

CI 101 – Conduct Priority and Volume Investigations;

CJ 101 – Interview Victims and Witnesses in relation to priority and volume investigations.

PIP is intended to raise standards of investigation and should, therefore, be applied to all investigators.

A peer review process for PIP was conducted in 2007 and a consistent concern raised by forces was the level of supervisors’ knowledge and understanding of the requirements of the investigation, particularly those of staff investigating volume and priority crimes. This undermines a supervisor’s ability to effectively assess against the NOS. To address this, a set of NOS have been developed relating to supervising criminal investigations, ie,

CI 104 – Supervise Investigations and Investigators.

The provision of standards against which the performance of individual investigators can be assessed will have a positive impact on effectiveness and efficiency at individual and organisational levels.

PIP is a major business change programme that police forces are required to fully adopt in order to establish the capability to conduct investigations professionally. *Guidance on the Supervision of Investigations* is presently under development by the NPJA.

5.5 CLEARANCE OF CRIME REPORTS

Those responsible for screening volume crime should be solely responsible for the final sign off and clearing of all volume crime investigations, even though other supervisors contribute to this process.

Crimes should be cleared when they have either been detected or when the screener is satisfied that the secondary investigation plan has been completed. This is particularly relevant when an investigating officer has reached their quota of live investigations and needs to review the current workload. It is essential that the clearance procedure includes updating victims and witnesses of the progress of their case, in addition to identifying training needs.

Some BCUs have adopted a policy where volume crimes cannot be cleared until a victim has been contacted on at least three occasions. In any event, all forces in England and Wales are now bound by the *CJS (2005) Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, which details the service that victims can expect to receive.

5.6 THE NATIONAL POLICING PLEDGE

The most radical reform in *From the neighbourhood to the national: policing our communities together* was the introduction of the national Policing Pledge. For the first time the Pledge gives the public a set of national minimum standards that they are entitled to. This includes minimum contact with the victims of crime of at least once per month for as long as is deemed reasonable.

Individual forces will have their own 'citizen focus' or 'victims charter' regarding contact with the victims of crime. Some will reach an agreement with the victim about how often they would like to be kept informed of the progress of the investigation and for how long.

The benefits of regular contact are that further information or intelligence can be gathered, eg, use of stolen credit cards, mobile phone billing. Some crimes are even cleared as 'no crimes', eg, victims had mistakenly reported something as stolen when it had been mislaid or borrowed by an acquaintance. This should also be regarded as an opportunity for community reassurance and contact. In addition, it should help to promote a positive image of the Police Service, comply with *CJS (2005) Code of Practice for Victims of Crime* and assist in the realisation of PPAF targets.

Recommendation 12

Generic investigation plans are used as a prompt for officers conducting primary investigations.

Recommendation 13

Bespoke investigation plans are included as part of the allocation of volume crimes for secondary investigation.

Section 6

SUSPECT MANAGEMENT

The arrest of a volume crime suspect is often treated as the conclusion of an investigation, and the subsequent period they are held in custody at the police station is influenced by a desire to process matters quickly. While the VCMM concludes that detained suspects must be dealt with expediently, a thorough investigation must, however, be conducted.

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6.1 SUSPECT MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Suspect management is part of the VCMM which can be applied to all arrested persons. It seeks to identify fast-track enquiries by putting case preparation at the start of the process. It builds on the initial, primary and secondary investigation plans by ensuring that the pre- and post-arrest phase is well planned and closely supervised.

It also provides a structured approach to on-the-job training underpinned by a support network which allows officers to work in a more focused and efficient manner while being actively supervised. See **Figure 4**.

6.2 EVIDENCE REVIEW

As with all other aspects of the VCMM, there is no single way to achieve the evidence review function. Some pilot forces, for example, appointed dedicated Evidence Review Officers (EROs) while others incorporated the role within existing prisoner processing units. One site designated the duty sergeant as the ERO and another only deployed dedicated EROs for certain periods, with duty CID officers filling the gaps. Regardless of which option is selected, it is important to have processes which can be replicated and supported by clear policies and procedures. The importance of this function was identified in ***Policing Bureaucracy Taskforce (2002) Change Proposals to Increase the Presence of Police in Communities***, which stated that the role was ‘...imperative if the police service is to get things right first time, every time in the business of crime investigation’.


The main advantages of an evidence review function include:

- Immediate post-arrest advice available to all officers;
- Improvement in the quality of primary evidence collection by officers;
- Improvement in the quality of handover packages;
- Consistent advice regarding search requirements and the appropriate seizure of property;
- Ensuring that all intelligence is captured;
- Ensuring that all security and identity checks are carried out;
- Ensuring that all crimes linked to the suspect are identified;
- On-the-job training;
- Effective management of bail;
- Identification of general and individual training needs.

The ERO is pivotal to all investigations involving those arrested for volume crime offences. Individuals performing the role should be aware of all crime prisoners, other prisoners of note, current BCU targets, prolific offenders, crime hot spots and intelligence requirements. They must be experienced investigators and interviewers who are fully conversant with relevant legislation and guidance, eg, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and ***ACPO (2008) Practice Advice on Evidence of Bad Character, Second Edition***.

The ERO and the investigating officer (or arresting officer) should have a meeting at the point when a suspect’s detention is authorised. Ideally, in the event of a pre-planned arrest, the officer in the case should meet the ERO prior to taking any action.

Figure 4 Suspect Management Process



The meeting should focus on final case preparation and explore what evidence needs to be established. An interview strategy (including disclosure) should also be agreed. It will conclude with an investigation plan being written and recorded, to ensure compliance with the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and provide an audit trail of decisions. After the initial meeting, the ERO should continue to be involved in the investigation to ensure that the plan is followed and to make further recommendations as matters develop.

If a decision has been made to charge the suspect, the ERO should explore whether conditional bail or an application for a remand in custody should be considered. While this is ultimately a decision for the custody officer, the ERO should be prepared to assist the investigating officer to make an appropriate case.

The evidence review function should be seen as part of the supervisory support process and is not intended to compromise the role of the custody officer or other supervisors.

An example of an Evidential Review Officer Suspect Management Plan can be found in **Appendix 8**.

Evidence Review Officer Role Profile

The ERO oversees the investigation of all persons arrested for volume crime offences in order to ensure the continued quality of investigations, the appropriate disposal of detainees and that every opportunity is taken to gather intelligence. The ERO should be accredited to PIP Level 2, as a minimum standard.

This role includes:

- Carrying out an initial assessment of arrested persons brought into custody, ensuring that evidence is secured;
- Setting an investigation plan, clearly identifying the arresting officer's (and investigating officer's) responsibilities and priority lines of enquiry;
- Identifying key witnesses;
- Advising on all necessary actions to ensure compliance with relevant legislation at all times;
- Advising on the requirement for searches of premises and vehicles;
- Ensuring the appropriate seizure of property;
- Discussing and confirming the interview strategy;
- Ensuring that local and national intelligence and crime databases are researched;
- Providing a single point of contact between the investigator and the CPS;
- Considering the relevance of drugs intervention programmes and diversionary schemes;
- Considering suitable disposal of the suspect with the officer in charge (OIC) and custody officer;
- Identifying persistent offenders and ensuring that appropriate action is taken;
- Identifying suitable detainees for cell intervention by intelligence units;
- Ensuring that all intelligence is submitted via 5x5x5 templates;
- Advising on asset recovery and financial investigation.

Investigative Coach Role Profile

The Investigative Coach is a role which can supplement the work of the principal screener and ERO by acting as an expert in investigative techniques and coaching inexperienced officers. They also liaise with those tasked with the provision of training. Some pilot sites combined this role with that of the ERO. The Investigative Coach should be accredited to PIP Level 2, as a minimum standard.

The role includes:

- Assuming the role of general coach to the more junior officers and any officer who requires advice, and providing on-the-job training;
- Reviewing working practices, highlighting common weaknesses and taking remedial action;
- Identifying best practice and ensuring its dissemination.

6.3 OFFENCES TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION (TIC)

The ERO plays an important role in ensuring that every opportunity is taken to increase the number of a suspect's further offences being taken into consideration (TIC) in an ethical and transparent manner.

The detection of further offences by way of TIC is a legitimate way of finalising investigations and is fully endorsed by the Home Office National Crime Recording Standards. This practice has no statutory foundation, but it does have a long history and offers the following advantages:

- It gives victims of crime the satisfaction of knowing that the offence committed against them – or more likely against their property – has been detected and the offender has been sentenced;
- A crime admitted in this way is a crime detected, and may properly be recorded as such, thereby increasing the detection rate, narrowing the justice gap and increasing public confidence in the administration of justice;
- In those cases where there is evidence of guilt, it offers a cheap and convenient way to record an admission of guilt, without the need for the preparation of witness statements or a full trial bundle;
- It offers a convicted defendant the opportunity to make a full confession of all their offences so that they can know that there is no other matter outstanding against them, with the result that, when they have completed their sentence, they may make a fresh start, without fear of a 'gate arrest' on their release from prison.

There are recognised limits to the practice of taking offences into consideration and the following are safeguards to the procedure:

- An offence should not be taken into consideration if the public interest requires that it should be the subject matter of a separate charge and, if necessary, a separate trial;
- The court should only take into consideration offences which are similar to those in respect of which convictions have already been recorded;
- The court should only take into account offences which it has jurisdiction to try – thus a crown court should not take into account summary offences (and most certainly a magistrates' court should not take into account offences which are only triable on indictment);
- The court should not take into account an offence which carries a disqualification or endorsement (since such penalties cannot be imposed when an offence is taken into consideration);
- The practice of taking any particular offence or offences into consideration requires the consent of the Crown Prosecution Service (which may be given informally);
- The court, the Crown Prosecution Service and the police should be alert to the possibility of abuse, whereby defendants admit offences they have not in fact committed.

Clear procedures and guidance to assist investigators should be developed and documented in a policy that is disseminated to all staff involved in the processing of suspects, including custody officers.

Several forces have implemented proactive initiatives aimed at increasing the number of offences resolved by way of TIC. These can include encouragement letters, posters in prominent locations and the provision of guidance to investigating officers. Such initiatives, however, are more effective when they are part of a wider policy in which analysis is a main component. The VCMM pilot revealed that the most effective way of increasing TICs was to target prolific offenders rather than simply subjecting every detainee to an initiative which was high on presentation but low on substance.

An example of a TIC policy can be found in **Appendix 9**.

6.4 CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (CPS) – STATUTORY CHARGING

The implementation of the statutory charging arrangements establishes crown prosecutors within police stations so that decisions can be made on the disposal of detainees in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

During the VCMM pilot it became apparent that some meetings between investigating officers and duty prosecutors determined prematurely whether a suspect was charged or not. Occasionally, decisions were made on the evidence available at the time of the meeting. This sometimes meant that solvable crimes were discontinued as a result of officers' inexperience, reluctance to increase their workload, or poor supervision. Detainees were frequently released on bail pending further enquiries, when it would have been possible to have completed the investigation while the detainee remained in custody.

Those pilot sites which had dedicated EROs found that much could be gained by making this role the single point of contact with the CPS. A working relationship was established between the ERO and the CPS which facilitated informed discussions about investigations, including early consultation in some cases, to determine likely offences and subsequent lines of enquiry. This was conducted in a way which did not compromise the role of the CPS or dilute police responsibilities; it was a pragmatic approach to determine the way in which complex investigations should be progressed.

Other benefits included:

- Early agreement on an evidential target plan for forensic and medical evidence;
- Development of an agreed prosecution plan;
- Prioritised preparation of files;
- Bail decisions based on up-to-date information;
- Prioritised cases in court listing arrangements;
- Preparation for remand hearings.

6.5 STEAMLINED PROSECUTION PROCESS

The Prosecution Team (2008) The Director's Guidance on the Streamlined Process Guidance to Police Officers and Crown Prosecutors under S37A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 concerning the streamlining of certain prosecution case files explains the streamlining of prosecution case files.

The streamlined process sets out guidance which applies to cases chargeable by the police without reference to a crown prosecutor, in accordance with **DPP (2007) The Director's Guidance on Charging (2007)**. It includes police charged casework where a not guilty plea may be anticipated.

The streamlined process also provides for a staged and proportionate approach in the preparation of the cases which must be referred to a prosecutor for a charging decision.

6.6 SIMPLE SPEEDY SUMMARY JUSTICE

This initiative is aimed at speeding up the summary justice at the magistrates' court and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of case management overall. The scheme focuses on three key stages:

- Pre-court;
- At first hearing;
- From first hearing to trial.

It introduces simplified file process mechanisms to ensure that information is available to the defence at an early stage, thereby avoiding adjournments. It shortens the whole court process, and increases public confidence in the criminal justice system.

For further information see *Home Office/CJS/DCA (2005) Delivering Simple, Speedy, Summary Justice* at <http://www.cjsonline.gov.uk>

6.7 INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

The ERO should use every opportunity available to maximise intelligence gathering and to ensure that offenders are debriefed effectively.

Understanding why an individual commits a certain type of crime and what they do to commit it, when combined with a particular MO and geographical preference, contributes to the intelligence product. All intelligence gathered must be detailed in 5x5x5 intelligence reports, which should then be forwarded on to the Intelligence Unit.

The ERO must be aware of the BCU and force intelligence requirements.

6.8 BAIL MANAGEMENT

While there is a presumption that everybody has a right to be considered for bail, the process must be managed in order to conduct proper investigations, protect the public and use resources effectively.

Investigators should follow investigative plans and ensure that all possible lines of enquiry are conducted before arrests are made, thereby reducing the need to bail suspects. Systems should be developed so that as much investigation as possible is undertaken before arrest or immediately after arrest, so that need for bail is reduced.

The main elements of bail management are:

- Identified role on each BCU having oversight and accountability for bail issues;
- Effective decision making on whether bail is required, based on the circumstances of the case;
- Effective decision making concerning the length of bail, based on the circumstances of the case;
- Force-wide corporate bail management policies and structures.

An example of a Bail Management Policy can be found in **Appendix 10**.

6.9 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

This process holds offenders directly accountable to their victims in cases where both the victim and offender agree. A restorative conference brings both parties together within a controlled environment, along with other relevant individuals such as parents, in a process which is facilitated by a trained police officer or trained volunteer.

The meeting holds the offender personally accountable to both the victim and local community for the harm they have caused and for making amends. It empowers the victims and places them at the centre of the process.

The merits of this process are identified in *Flanagan, Sir R. (2008) Independent Review of Policing in England and Wales*. A restorative justice approach can substantially cut costs, save police time, assist in tackling anti-social behaviour and help to reduce repeat offending, while providing a majority of victims who take part with a satisfactory resolution.

Such disposals used for dealing with low-level offending give the police and communities an opportunity to divert offenders away from the criminal justice system, while helping to reduce reoffending, improve victim focus and unite local communities in a collective response to crime.

6.9.1 BENEFITS

Restorative disposals must add value to the process by being victim focused as well as effective in reducing reoffending. Some benefits of the process include:

- Reduced frequency of reoffending;
- Significant cost benefits;
- Increased efficiency and use of resources;
- Allows officers to spend further time on the street dealing with serious crime;
- Reduces bureaucracy;
- Increases public satisfaction by directly engaging the affected parties in the disposal;
- Allows a fair and meaningful challenge without the weight and expense of the court system;
- Provides a learning opportunity for young offenders to appreciate the effect of their behaviour.

Neighbourhood policing is about serving the local community. A restorative approach ensures victims feel that something is being done to address their concerns at a personal level, and usually improves their confidence in the criminal justice system. It can often result in a more positive outcome for both the victim and offender.

*ACC Steve Mortimore,
Citizen Focus and Neighbourhood Policing Programme Director, NPJA.*

6.10 INTEGRATED OFFENDER MANAGEMENT

The primary purpose of the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) approach is to reduce reoffending and cut crime.

The IOM was inspired by the success of Prolific and Other Priority Offender (PPO) schemes, the Drug Interventions Programme (DIP), Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) and Neighbourhood Policing teams. It has since been adopted by a number of police forces and probation areas.

By understanding what triggers an individual to commit crime, police officers can work with other relevant agencies such as the Jobcentre, NHS, and the Local Authority Housing Departments to prevent reoffending.

This approach forges and extends joint identification and assessment, offender management and information sharing frameworks for those offenders in the community who present a very high risk of reoffending. It applies particularly to offenders who receive short sentences and are released from prison under no statutory supervision.

One of the key principals is to break the cycle of persistent and/or prolific offending, particularly where alcohol and drug addiction is a factor in offending behaviour.

Such schemes have shown that the Police Service, Probation Service and youth offending teams can achieve better outcomes by working in partnership with other agencies, integrating core business to make the best use of shared skills and resources.

By using new and existing partners to supervise and rehabilitate offenders, IOM approaches draw on the resources and support of all relevant partners to supervise, resettle and rehabilitate young and adult offenders.

The operational principals are:

- Extending the reach of community supervision;
- Multi-agency problem solving;
- Offender rights and responsibilities;
- Offender management and continuity and consistency;
- Clear partnership governance.

6.11 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

Suspect management is a complex aspect of the VCMM and, as such, specific performance measures should be established. The main aim of these would be to monitor the performance of those fulfilling the evidence review roles and to ensure that every suspect is dealt with appropriately. This should include the routine examination and dip sampling of post-arrest investigation plans to ascertain the following:

- Disposal rates (charge, bail, refuse charge);
- Sanctioned detections including TIC per suspect;
- Premises searched in accordance with section 18 PACE 1984;
- Intelligence reports submitted.

Other performance measures can be introduced throughout the investigation process, to ensure that investigations are conducted expeditiously with the maximum potential to capture detections by:

- Ensuring development of primary investigation plans from the outset after informed evaluation and allocation;
- Monitoring the investigative progress throughout by intrusive supervision;
- Support from a concurrent system of performance management, examining investigation progression, conversion and detection turnover of each investigator;
- An audit review before finalisation.

Recommendation 14

A clearly defined performance management regime should be deployed regarding volume crime, and included as part of the operational review process.

Recommendation 15

A second tier of supervision or management should be established to ensure the quality of investigations.

Recommendation 16

Volume crime investigators are subjected to regular reviews to ensure maximum opportunities for bringing offenders to justice.

Recommendation 17

A suspect management process is adopted to ensure that every opportunity is taken to gather evidence and intelligence.

Recommendation 18

Evidence Review Officers (EROs) are established as part of the suspect management process.

Recommendation 19

Bail management policies and procedures are introduced and enforced.

6.12 OPERATION QUEST

Since 2006, the Home Office, external consultants KPMG and participating police forces have been working together to produce a unique method to deliver significant performance improvements to frontline policing. Through this Home Office initiative, called Operation Quest, forces have been encouraged to undertake a different approach to performance improvement, change management and the analysis of their everyday business. The results have included heightened morale, increased performance and raised citizen satisfaction ratings.

As a business process re-engineering technique, Quest is used to analyse a policing problem, identify improvement solutions and implement them, based on a clear business case.

Quest is currently being used by a number of police forces, enabling them to improve their internal processes without the need for external support. By using Quest, forces should see significant improvements in performance and cost savings, and this in turn should increase the impetus to improve business processes throughout the Police Service.

For further information please contact the Quest development team in the Capability Support business area of the NPIA.

Section 7

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VCMM

The successful implementation of the VCMM depends on critical and influential factors. The model should be considered as part of normal business and must, therefore, be fully integrated with NIM procedures. This section explores how this can be achieved from a strategic perspective.

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7.1	Leadership	50
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7.1 LEADERSHIP

A VCMM needs strong support from a chief officer if it is to be successful. Forces should, therefore, have a designated ACPO officer to actively support the implementation of the VCMM.

There must also be a willingness and enthusiasm from BCU commanders to undertake the necessary changes to structures and processes to enable its implementation.

Finally, a dynamic and credible project lead should be appointed in each BCU to act as the champion for change and tackling volume crime in all aspects of BCU business.

7.2 CULTURAL CHANGE

The implementation of the VCMM will involve significant cultural change to staff practices and responsibilities for some forces. It may also require reallocation of resources and possible retraining of staff. The early identification of champions at various levels within the command structure, who believe in the improvement to current processes and have the qualities and credibility to win over less enthusiastic staff, is an invaluable contribution to change management.

The need to invest in the training and development of staff for this purpose is crucial. This is evidenced in the report *Police Superintendents' Association (2003) Factors that Impact on BCU Performance*, which states that the single, most important contributor to BCU performance was the availability of competent and experienced staff.

It follows, therefore, that staff who are adequately trained and motivated, need to be in the key posts in order to achieve this competence. This is then likely to maintain the energy and enthusiasm required beyond the initial roll-out.

A VCMM checklist can be used to monitor progress towards implementation. A draft checklist is contained in **Appendix 11**.

7.3 MARKETING

The VCMM pilot revealed the value of marketing the model within a BCU and with partner organisations. The benefits of internal marketing include having a workforce that fully understands the model and the reasons why changes are necessary to their working practices. The effectiveness of external marketing was highlighted at one pilot site where a presentation was made to the local CPS. This resulted in a protocol being agreed concerning applications for remands in custody. A different pilot site was able to task local authority staff to carry out specific functions at identified volume crime scenes, including targeted patrols.

Recommendation 20

The appointment of a chief officer to oversee the VCMM process.

Recommendation 21

The appointment of a VCMM champion in each BCU.

Recommendation 22

The roles and staff involved in the VCMM should be PIP accredited.

APPENDIX 1

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
APA	Association of Police Authorities
APACS	Analysis of Policing and Community Safety
ASBO	Anti-Social Behaviour Order
BCU	Basic Command Unit (or other operational command unit)
CCTV	Closed-Circuit Television
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIS	Crime Intelligence System
CJS	Criminal Justice System
CMU	Crime Management Unit
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CPSD	Crown Prosecution Service Direct
DCRT	Dedicated Crime Response Team
DIP	Drug Interventions Programme
DMM	Daily Management Meeting
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid
DVLA	Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency
ERO	Evidence Review Officer
FIB	Force Intelligence Bureau
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
H2H	House-to-House
IMU	Incident Management Unit
IO	Investigating Officer
IOM	Integrated Offender Management
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements
MO	Modus Operandi
NCPE	National Centre for Policing Excellence
NCRS	National Crime Recording Standards
NHS	National Health Service
NFA	No Further Action
NIM	National Intelligence Model
NOS	National Occupational Standards
NPIA	National Policing Improvement Agency
OIC	Officer in Charge/Officer in the Case
PACE	Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer

PDR	Personal Development Review
PIP	Professionalising Investigation Programme
PNC	Police National Computer
PPO	Prolific and Other Priority Offender
PSA	Public Service Agreement
PYO	Persistent Young Offender
QUEST	Querying Using Extended Search Techniques
RIC	Remand in Custody
SDN	Short Descriptive Note
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SMT	Senior Management Team
SNEN	Single Non-Emergency Number
SOCO	Scenes of Crime Officer
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
TCG	Tasking and Co-ordinating Group
TE	Transaction Enquiry
TIC	Taken Into Consideration
TWOC	Taken Without Consent
VCMM	Volume Crime Management Model
VIPER	Video Identification of Persons
VODS	Vehicle Online Descriptive Search (on PNC)

APPENDIX 2

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REFERENCES

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APPENDIX 3

EXAMPLE OF A SCRIPT TO ASSIST CALL HANDLERS

EXAMPLE OF A SCRIPT TO ASSIST CALL HANDLERS

This example refers to reports of stolen motor vehicles.

If the vehicle bears the new style of registration, ie, 51 or newer, then the victim must be asked the following questions.

Witnesses – Evidence

Are there any witnesses?

Is there CCTV at the location where the vehicle was parked?

Is there physical evidence at the scene, eg, broken glass or discarded tools?

Did the alarm activate?

Who was the last person to see the vehicle other than the owner?

Insurance and Registration

Who is the vehicle insured with?

What sort of policy is in place (Fully Comp/Third Party/Fire/Theft/Trader)?

Who else has access to and use of the vehicle?

Is the vehicle registered with the DVLA in the driver's name?

Vehicle's Last Movements

When and where the vehicle was last refuelled?

Where had the vehicle been parked during the days prior to the theft?

Has the vehicle been to a garage for repairs lately?

Ownership

How long have you owned the vehicle?

How many keys did you get when you bought the vehicle?

How many of the keys are accounted for now?

Where was the vehicle bought from?

Is there any finance on the vehicle?

Are the payments up to date?

Maintenance History

When the vehicle was last serviced.

Where the vehicle was last serviced.

Has this vehicle previously been written off in an accident?

APPENDIX 4 EXAMPLE OF A GENERIC PRIMARY INVESTIGATION PLAN

EXAMPLE OF A GENERIC PRIMARY INVESTIGATION PLAN

Primary Investigation of Crime – Aide-Memoire

Take report from victim

- Get the details right first time, eg, sex, age, self-defined ethnicity;
- Remember the contact phone numbers.

Arrest suspect if at scene or identified through initial investigation

- Arresting suspect at earliest opportunity could secure good evidence and solve the crime quickly.

List your structured investigation on the 'free text' field – record your individual lines of enquiry by number as follows:

1 Take full suspect description
• Record the actions you have taken to trace this suspect. • List other enquiries – PNC, TE, VODS, QUEST, CIS, photographs circulated. Department for Work and Pensions.
2 Consider the scene
• Preserve the scene for SOCO if appropriate – record this. • If a serious crime – cordon off and commence a scene log.
3 CCTV potential
• Recover CCTV evidence at or nearby the scene and exhibit it. • Record any other CCTV evidence you have not yet obtained.
4 House-to-house
• Consider house-to-house in relation to burglary, robbery or other serious crime. • Record all the house-to-house completed with the result, negative or positive.
5 Witnesses
• List other potential witnesses and what evidence they could provide. Record their potential for VIPER.
6 Other evidence
• Where appropriate, seize exhibits. • Document, photograph injuries and ensure forensic evidence is obtained.
7 Statements
• Obtain statements for threats to kill, robbery, burglary artifice (proforma), when a person has been arrested, there is a named suspect, where directed to by supervisor. • For all crime – list who else a statement would be needed from and why.
8 Record crime before going off duty

APPENDIX 5

SUGGESTED SCREENING POLICY GUIDE

SUGGESTED SCREENING POLICY GUIDE

This guide identifies crimes by category in order to assist in the decision-making process regarding further investigation. It is anticipated that NIM processes, particularly the control strategy, will determine the specific crimes in each category.

Mandatory Crimes

These are matters which should always be allocated for further investigation, and an investigation plan will need to be issued. Mandatory crimes include the more serious crimes, eg, murder and rape.

Priority Crimes

These crimes are not mandatory but should be considered closely for further investigation. The majority of such crimes will reflect BCU priorities and may even be referred to as 'signal crimes'. It may be necessary to research such crimes in order to decide whether to allocate or not. If further investigation is needed, an investigation plan should be issued.

Non-Priority Crimes

These are crimes which are not classified as being either mandatory or priority. In normal circumstances they should not be allocated for further investigation unless there is a clear likelihood of detection. If this is the case, the crime should be allocated together with an investigation plan.

APPENDIX 6

SUGGESTED SOLVABILITY TEMPLATE

SUGGESTED SOLVABILITY TEMPLATE

This template should be of value in deciding which priority and non-priority crimes are allocated for further investigation, and in determining when all crime investigations should be finalised.

Crime is likely to be solved if any of the following are immediately available and link the suspect to the offence:

- Named Suspect;
- Identification Evidence;
- Forensic Evidence or Intelligence;
- Identifiable Property;
- Intelligence;
- Linked Series.

Although the following explanations are intended to reinforce the terms, each must not be treated in isolation and consideration must always be given as to the likelihood of achieving these outcomes through investigation. For example, the victim of a street robbery may not be able to identify the offender, but there is a likelihood that witnesses could be traced if the crime was investigated.

Named Suspect

When the name of a suspect is known or is likely to become apparent. This also includes incidents where there is CCTV evidence of previously unidentified suspects.

Identification Evidence

A witness is likely to identify the suspect again through formal identification or is able to describe the physical attributes of the suspect to such an extent that the offender is likely to be identified.

Forensic Evidence/Intelligence

There is forensic material available which has the potential to link the suspect to the scene, victim or other offender.

Identifiable Property

The evidence derived from property has the potential to link the suspect directly to the crime. This could include property left by suspects, a vehicle abandoned or positively identified.

Intelligence

Intelligence to identify the suspect or detect the crime should be included as a factor which may help solve a crime. There is a need, however, to balance the protection of the source with the proportionality of the investigation.

Linked Series

In the strictest terms, a crime series is identified as a number of crimes which are so strikingly similar that when a suspect is identified there would be enough evidence to charge the other crimes on the basis of similar factual evidence. Crimes which are linked in this way should always be further investigated.

APPENDIX 7

EXAMPLES OF

SECONDARY

INVESTIGATION PLANS

EXAMPLES OF SECONDARY INVESTIGATION PLANS

The following examples have been captured from the crime recording system of a pilot BCU. While they are specific to that location and may not be compatible with all crime recording systems, they are intended to illustrate a secondary investigation plan.

INVESTIGATION PLAN: Burglary Dwelling

- 1 Make contact with the victim to complete the list of stolen property.
- 2 Circulate an E-fit within force including Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB).
- 3 Obtain a statement from witnesses detailing the description of the offenders, and paying particular attention to the actual words spoken by them.
- 4 Liaise with SOCO re submission of forensic exhibits.
- 5 Update screens I and P as enquiries progress.

INVESTIGATION PLAN: Phone Harassment

- 1 Do not obtain a statement until you believe you have sufficient evidence to identify the suspect as responsible.
- 2 If text messages have been received and are still on the phone, you will need to seize the complainant's mobile phone if they will consent. This is the complainant's exhibit and you will require them to sign an exhibit label. This will need to be submitted to the communications unit or one of the independent companies now offering the same service. They can download the texts into evidential form. Contact the communications unit first to ensure they have the capability.
- 3 You will then need to carry out a check of subscriber details on the suspect's home and mobile telephone numbers to prove ownership by the suspect, as well as itemised billing to prove contact between suspect and complainant.

- 4 Once you have evidence identifying the suspect as responsible, obtain a complainant's statement of the offence covering how the suspect is known to them, how long they have been known, and where the suspect lives. Also include how long the messages have been received for, the format they have taken, ie, text and phone calls and the words spoken. Detail the suspect's land line and mobile numbers and how they know these to belong to the suspect. Ensure that the level of anguish, fear and distress is included.
- 5 Once you have collated all the evidence, ensure the suspect's details are entered on the front screen and that enquiries to arrest the suspect commence.
- 6 Update screen I with enquiries before overdue date, covering the above points.

APPENDIX 8

EVIDENTIAL REVIEW OFFICER (ERO) SUSPECT MANAGEMENT PLAN

The below example is a template that was used by EROs in a VCMM pilot site.

Practice Advice on the Management of Priority and Volume Crime, Second Edition © ACPO NPJA 2009
NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

INVESTIGATION PLAN

To be completed by Evidential Review Officer

Officer/Team

Date

MG3/MG3a Submitted electronically

Y/N

FURTHER INVESTIGATION PLAN

To be completed by Evidential Review Officer

Officer/Team

Date

APPENDIX 9

EXAMPLE OF A

TIC POLICY

EXAMPLE OF A TIC POLICY

Taken Into Consideration (TIC) Procedure – Surrey Police 2009

Introduction

Where there is evidence to charge a person with an offence, in particular for acquisitive crime, all Surrey Police and CPS staff should consider the capture of further like offences.

This applies to all suspects admitting offences in interviews, and provisions should be considered for offenders who are at court, or other locations, wishing to accept TICs.

The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and PACE Code C state that police officers are entitled to interview suspects for offences other than for those which resulted in the initial arrest/allegation, as long as there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the offender's involvement in those other offences.

To maintain integrity all actions and decisions should be clearly explained and documented to provide a detailed, evidential, audit trail.

Roles and Responsibilities

Custody Staff

To demonstrate the commitment of Surrey Police to capture further offences, a TIC awareness notice will be served to every detainee in custody along with their rights and entitlements.

If the suspect cannot read, a member of custody staff should read the notice to the suspect and record that they have done so on the custody record, in accordance with PACE.

This demonstration of commitment will be supported by the overt display of TIC posters at key points in all Surrey Police custody centres.

- All staff should draw attention to TIC posters throughout the suspect's detention.
- All posters should be kept in good order and replaced if damaged or defaced.

Officer in the Case (OIC)

OICs (investigating officer) must consider searching the suspect(s), their address, work address and vehicle for further evidence. This must always be considered when investigating acquisitive crime.

From the outset, the OIC must seek knowledge of:

- The suspect, their vehicle, their addresses, their work, their lifestyle;
- Primary offence location;
- Outstanding offences with a similar MO/same location/suspects similar in description to the arrested person;
- Offences involving the suspect's vehicle;
- Outstanding DNA or fingerprint identifications of the suspect.

Check PNC and intelligence systems for:

- Suspect's criminal history;
- VODS (Vehicle Online Descriptive Search);
- QUEST (Querying Using Extended Search Techniques);
- PNC transaction enquiry (these will give details of officers who have checked your suspect or vehicle nationally).

Interviews

The PEACE model should be applied:

- **P**lanning and Preparation;
- **E**ngage and Explain;
- **A**ccount, Clarification and Challenge;
- **C**losure;
- **E**valuation.

Use Bad Character Provisions – if the suspect has committed or has been suspected of similar offences, this evidence can present powerful challenges in interview.

Staged disclosure should be considered in particular when:

- Examining account in relation to forensic evidence/witness evidence;
- Use of special warnings;
- Use of bad character evidence.

Capturing TIC Offences

OICs must consider whether:

- The suspect admitted their involvement in the primary offence or given an account;
- There is sufficient evidence to consider a charge for the primary offence;
- The suspect has been given sufficient opportunity to talk about the primary offence;
- There are reasons to believe the suspect may have committed further offences;
- The suspect's legal representative has been informed that the police may consider other offences being put before the court to be TIC.

It is not necessary to halt an interview to charge with the initial offence when sufficient evidence is gained of other offences, as PACE permits a delay while the suspect is interviewed about other offences (PACE Code C 16.1).

Other Offences Notice to Detainee and TIC Statements

If the suspect has admitted their involvement in the primary offence, then the OIC may inform the suspect and/or their representative that a statement can be provided by police in the case file in relation to capture of TICs.

This statement can be provided for an understanding of the context of any further offences to be taken into consideration for the judge and/or magistrate when sentencing, such as:

- The cooperation of the suspect during the investigation;
- Whether there would have been sufficient evidence to capture the TIC without the cooperation of the suspect;
- If there is any indication of motivation to change and contrition.

The court thus may look favourably at sentencing the suspect for:

- Being open and contrite;
- Saving public money and time by cooperating;
- Assisting in closure for victims.

The OIC must ensure that, at the same time, they illustrate to the suspect and/or their representative the risks in not taking the opportunity to have further offences taken into consideration. Where further evidence comes to light of offences that they have committed, they may be subject to further charges.

The OIC will then formally ensure the following:

- The suspect and/or their representative will be handed the other offences notice;
- The suspect will be asked to sign the notice and will be provided with a copy;
- A signed copy to be placed in the case file.

Other Offences Notice

When the OIC is ready to ask the suspect to admit to TIC offences, the officer should consider using similar wording to the example below, which illustrates the benefits in addition to the risks of not taking the opportunity.

Before the interview, you were handed a notice explaining the benefits of cooperating in providing accounts of other offences you may have committed and the risks should further evidence come to light.

You have admitted responsibility for the offence/offences of [...] for which you may be charged.

This is your opportunity for a clean sheet and to admit responsibility now for other offences you have committed. If these are similar to the offence you are charged with, the court can 'take these offences into consideration' when sentencing you, if found guilty of the crime(s) you are charged with. Do you have anything else you wish to say?

The OIC must adhere strictly to the points below:

- Where TICs are to be discussed as part of a separate interview, the suspect must still be cautioned so that evidence of any admissions made will be admissible at court, should those offences later be the subject of charges;
- A reference to the service of the other offences notice must form part of an interview and be tape-recorded;
- Subsequent comments or admissions in relation to other offences must be in interview and tape-recorded;
- Once the warning has been given, allow for the interview to be suspended as the suspect may wish to consult their legal representative in private;
- Further interviews must be recorded in accordance with PACE;
- Inducements cannot be made, and phrases which may be interpreted as an offer of bail in return for admissions, or promises that all admissions from thereon will be 'TIC'd' should not be used.

If a suspect asks what will happen if they admit to other offences, the OIC can illustrate the following to them:

- Acceptance of TIC offences may be reflected in probation service reports on repeat drug dependent offenders as a motivation to change, and the courts may consider Drug Testing Treatment Orders as an alternative to custodial sentences.

Integrity

Home Office requirements are that offences can only be accepted as TICs if there is sufficient evidence to deal with them by way of a charge. For example, it may be that the suspect's account of the offence contains details which could only have been known by the person committing it, and they are told to the interviewing officer without prompting.

Emphasis on the integrity of the admissions must be supported by:

- Documentary corroboration of the account in the admission by the suspect;
- An account by the suspect which matches the method or a specific factor in the relevant crime report.

The statement from the OIC must ensure:

- The context of capture of other offences to be taken into consideration;
- The suspect's cooperation is shown along with how it assisted the investigation.

Officers TIC Statement to the Court

While dealing with suspects, officers should be mindful that:

- A continuing assessment will be required to decide whether to arrest for the offences or aim to deal with the offences as TICs;
- There is no need to arrest and caution for each TIC offence admitted to during the interview.

The suspect should be arrested at the conclusion of the interview if:

- The offences which are admitted are serious and could affect the possibility of the suspect being granted bail and remanded in custody;
- The time in custody could be substantially increased;
- The crimes admitted are not like offences.

When suspects are produced from prison prior to sentence, all actions away from custody to identify offence venues must be conducted with integrity and contemporaneous notes taken and then corroborated in a tape-recorded interview.

Corroboration and Like Offences

Following disclosure of other offences the OIC must:

- Conduct secondary research in order to confirm that the details given are correct;
- Record all crimes if not already completed;
- Identify and contact the victim;
- Ensure the offences disclosed are suitable for TIC;
- Confirm **not** more serious than the offence(s) to be charged.

Seriousness depends on:

- The type of offence;
- Stolen property values, impact and cost;
- Victim's vulnerability;
- Time of day;
- Type of premises.

TICs must be for similar offences, for example:

Charge – Burglary and TIC – Theft, TWOC;

Charge – Rape and TIC – Indecent Assault;

Charge – Drugs Supply and TIC – Possession.

Offences that carry a further punitive sentence such as traffic-related matters that may result in disqualification or licence endorsement are not suitable for TIC.

The CPS decides on the final composition of charges and TICs. There are no strict rules as to the ratio of charges to TICs, but this should be 'reasonable'.

In extreme cases, for example, one charge to fifteen or more other offences, which the suspect wishes to be TIC'd, it would be advisable to consult the CPS.

Case Preparation and Submission

The OIC will, therefore, ensure that:

- An interview that complies with PACE is conducted for capturing all TIC offences;
- There is a signed MG18 confirmed by an interview;
- A PACE compliant interview is carried out where TIC offences are contemporaneously recorded in a pocket notebook, and signed by the offender;
- TIC offences presented in court are recorded on an MG18 and copies placed on the case file and in the CMU;
- A copy of any interview is placed in the case file.
- A statement for an understanding of the context of any further offences to be taken into consideration is given to the judge and/or magistrate, when sentencing;
- An MG6 showing that further offences are to be taken into consideration, and a statement in relation to offender cooperation are contained in the case file.

Victim statements are **not** required for TICs unless they have already been taken.

All sections of the MG18 must be completed for all TIC offences accepted. The MG18 should then be signed by the suspect as soon as possible, although their release cannot be delayed for this purpose alone.

A short descriptive note (SDN) should be included on the MG15 as evidence of best practice, to show to the CPS and the defence that admissions have been made to each offence and every listed TIC offence. The SDN should include the TIC number (as per the MG18 schedule) in the margin opposite the admission to allow cross-checking against the TIC schedule.

TIC offences obtained in court should be recorded contemporaneously and the note attached to the file.

TIC Offences Not Accepted in Interview or at Court

If an offender has accepted and signed a TIC offence form in an interview or at another location, but changes their mind at court and no longer wishes to accept the offences they originally agreed to TIC, it is their right to withdraw the TIC offences.

These offences should be reviewed with the CPS, and consideration given to charging the offender with each of these offences separately.

Similarly, the OIC may indicate on the confidential information to the CPS that a TIC opportunity was offered during interview and declined.

OICs will submit a 5x5x5 to indicate that the offer has been declined, and this information will be added to suspect's nominal record. In the event of further evidence coming to light then consideration can be given to further charge.

TIC offences from an offender who is in prison post sentence require a superintendent's authority before forwarding the file request to the CPS to consider whether to prosecute.

Victim Notification and Compensation

It is essential that every victim of every TIC offence is personally notified that the offender has been brought to justice.

This will bring closure for the victim and help to maintain confidence in the criminal justice system.

Contact should be made with the victims of crimes, to ascertain the correct compensation details for property that is damaged, or stolen, so that an application can be made through the magistrate's court or crown court.

Occasionally, the original victim may not be entitled to any compensation, for example, where an insurance company has already compensated the victim. In these cases, the insurance company becomes the claimant.

The limit of compensation that can be claimed at a magistrates' court is £5,000 for any offence of which the court has convicted the offender. There is no limit at crown court.

Record of TICs

A copy of the fully completed TIC form, including the master crime reference, **must** be forwarded to the Crime Management Unit (CMU) for input onto the crime recording system, to gain the detection.

CMUs must not finalise a crime report until they are in possession of a signed TIC form and this must be filed under the crime reference number. The crime report must contain a clear audit trail of evidence and decision making, including confirmation of the PACE compliant interview in which the TIC offences were accepted.

Supervision

Supervisors should make themselves aware of any TIC offences that their officers are obtaining and ensure that:

- The TIC offences are accurate and appropriate;
- All opportunities for further detections have been maximised;
- TIC procedures have been followed with integrity;
- Any relevant actions have been taken as a consequence of the TIC offences, including notification to victims, and updating crime recording and intelligence systems.

Case directors will take on this supervisory role for all investigations they oversee and will also be available for advice in the absence of the investigator's own supervisor.

Supervisors should be proactive in ensuring that their team members possess the appropriate training and knowledge to allow them to consider and capture TIC offences at every suitable opportunity.

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OTHER OFFENCES NOTICE TO DETAINEE

Name of Detainee:

Custody Reference Number:

This notice is important if you have committed any other offences of a similar nature to the offence you have admitted.

If you admit the offences at this stage, they may be taken into consideration by the court when you are sentenced.

Due to scientific techniques such as the advance in DNA and fingerprinting, suspects are regularly identified at a time in the future. Offences can also be detected by other means such as the recovery of property and identification by a witness.

Should you be identified as a suspect at any time in the future you run the risk of being arrested and charged for offences you could have admitted today. This could lead to you being sentenced separately for these offences.

If you admit further offences, the police will examine each offence and ascertain whether a conviction would have been likely without your admission. If a conviction was likely, the court will be informed of this fact. You can then expect to be sentenced for the offence charged and the offence taken into consideration. However, before passing sentence, the court may take into account your cooperation in mitigation.

The court will also be informed of any offences you admit that the police believe would not ordinarily have been detected. In this case the officer in the case will submit a statement asking the court to give you credit for your cooperation when taking sentencing into account.

If you have committed any other offences I am now giving you the opportunity to have those offences taken into consideration.

Signature of detainee.....

Officer's signature

Solicitor's signature (if present)

Time/date

WITNESS STATEMENT

(CJ Act 1967, s.9; MC Act 1980, ss.5A(3) (a) and 5B; Criminal Procedure Rules 2005, Rule 27.1)

URN

45			
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Statement of:

Age if under 18: (if over 18 insert 'over 18')

Occupation:

This statement (consisting of 1 page(s) each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.

Signature:

Date:

 Tick if witness evidence is visually recorded ☐ (supply witness details on rear)

I am the officer in the case of R v who has asked that additional offence(s) is/are taken into consideration by the court on sentencing.

I have examined the facts surrounding the additional offence(s) and can say that but for the admission(s) he/she has made.....offence(s) may never have been detected.

I respectfully request that the court give him/her credit for his/her cooperation when sentence is passed.

Their full and frank admission(s) to any outstanding offences they have committed will allow the defendant to make a fresh start, once sentence is passed, knowing that he/she is not going to be arrested for any of these matters.

The admission(s) made will be communicated to the aggrieved and allow closure for the victim in relation to the offence(s) admitted by the accused.

APPENDIX 10

EXAMPLE OF A BAIL MANAGEMENT POLICY

EXAMPLE OF A BAIL MANAGEMENT POLICY

1 Introduction

- 1.1 Effective pre-charge bail management is key to the success of Cambridgeshire Constabulary. This policy recognises that this is the case and that bail decisions must be made in accordance with the Bail Act 1976 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
- 1.2 The objective is to deal with suspects in such a way as to reduce the need for police bail and, where it does have to be granted, to reduce the number of occasions where it is then extended or cancelled 'No Further Action'.
- 1.3 Supervisors should consider setting an appropriate PDR objective in relation to bail management for those staff in roles deployed in investigations – such as gatekeepers and custody officers.

2 Procedure

2.1 Pre-Arrest Procedures

- 2.1.1 When allocated a crime to investigate, the OIC must comply with the agreed investigation plan on the Crime File. This will ensure that best evidence is secured at an early opportunity. It should also mean that all viable lines of enquiry are conducted before the decision to arrest is made, thereby reducing the need to grant police bail. In some cases, however, an early arrest will be required, ie, at the time of report or, if not then, as soon as possible thereafter, but as much evidence as possible must be gathered so as to reduce the need to bail.
- 2.1.2 The Crime File should show the status of the enquiry where a genuine suspect is known, ie, 'to be arrested' will only be entered when all enquiries have been completed and a position has been reached which enables the suspect to be interviewed.
- 2.1.3 The file notes to show where the relevant paperwork can be located.

2.2 Post-Arrest Procedures

- 2.2.1 All handover packages are to be checked by a supervisor to quality assure them and to address any performance issues.

- 2.2.2 Detainees must be dealt with expeditiously and not held unnecessarily in the cells overnight. They should be interviewed as soon as there are sufficient resources to do so.
- 2.2.3 The OIC should identify outstanding enquiries with the gatekeeper at an early stage of detention and then seek assistance to complete those enquiries from other departments when necessary.
- 2.2.4 Custody officers should also assist the gatekeeper in ensuring that all viable lines of enquiry are conducted while detainees are in custody.
- 2.2.5 When the OIC has interviewed the detainee and completed the necessary enquiries for that investigation, they must seek the advice of a gatekeeper to ascertain whether further work is required prior to disposal by charge or other means, and whether the custody officer should be asked to grant bail.
- 2.2.6 Where no gatekeeper is on duty, the custody officer should perform the gatekeeper role.
- 2.2.7 Gatekeepers should challenge decisions made by the CPS or CPS Direct (CPSD), where appropriate.
- 2.2.8 Prior to any bail decision being made, the OIC must present the custody officer with a copy of the MG3 outlining the CPS advice and any additional gatekeeper advice so that they are aware of the state of the investigation and are able to make an informed decision.
- 2.2.9 Decisions to grant bail should be made by the custody officer using the attached decision-making process chart (Appendix B).
- 2.2.10 Where there is an issue over room in the bail diary, Prolific and Other Priority Offenders (PPOs) must take precedence even if this means altering the bail arrangements of other suspects in the diary. Such changes must be made with the OICs dealing with any suspects affected.
- 2.2.11 Officers visiting addresses to ascertain whether a detainee lives there must be able to provide detailed information of the enquiries that were made at an address so that custody officers can make fully informed decisions on conditional bail. Details of the officer who made the enquiries and the fact that the address has been confirmed as suitable, or not, must be recorded on the custody record.
- 2.2.12 The length of bail granted must be commensurate with the complexity of the case and anticipated conclusion of outstanding enquiries.
- 2.2.13 Bail should not be limited to Monday to Friday, 09.00 to 17.00 hours, particularly where there is likely to be a straight charge as this may lead to an earlier bail date and speed up the process of bringing offenders to justice.
- 2.2.14 When setting the bail date, the OIC/custody officer should ask the detainee if there is any reason why the suggested bail date is not convenient for them and accommodate any reasonable request to change the date.

- 2.2.15 Due consideration should be given to releasing a detainee without charge in certain cases, as opposed to the use of police bail. Where this occurs, the detainee ought to be advised that any evidence that would prove their innocence must be retained by them.
- 2.2.16 The OIC must inform the victim of a decision to bail the suspect as soon as possible and, in any case, within twenty-four hours of their release from custody. The OIC must also update the Crime File to that effect.

2.3 Procedure To Be Followed During the Bail-Back Period

- 2.3.1 The OIC should ensure that all files received from the CPS with advice or instructions for further investigation, are dealt with in a timely fashion. This means that all enquiries must be completed well in advance of the date the person is due to return to the police station.
- 2.3.2 Custody managers should ensure that OICs are reminded that they have a person returning on bail three days in advance of the return date and that they must ensure that they are in a position to progress the investigation. Should they not be in a position to proceed, they must notify their own manager and seek guidance or advice.
- 2.3.3 OICs have to consult the CPS lawyer once they have completed the outstanding enquiries and need to seek advice on charging. This advice should be obtained before the person is due to return on bail and should never be on the same day.
- 2.3.4 If an extension of a bail date becomes necessary, the authority of an inspector or above, should be obtained no less than three clear days before the detainee is due to return. Requests for authority in less time than this will not be authorised unless exceptional circumstances apply. The general reasons for extending the bail must be recorded on the custody record for that detainee and the Crime File duly updated.
- 2.3.5 Where the OIC considers that there is insufficient evidence to proceed against a person who has been bailed to return to the police station, a gatekeeper must be consulted. The gatekeeper should review the investigation and determine if any further enquiries or actions are appropriate. If the decision to NFA is still considered appropriate, the OIC will contact the custody officer, advising them of the decision and request that the person's bail be cancelled. Crime File must also be updated.
- 2.3.6 Where suspects are on police bail and the decision has been taken to NFA, the entry is then removed from the bail diary, thus ensuring that the diary contents remain accurate.
- 2.3.7 The custody officer is responsible for printing out a list of detainees due to return that day.
- 2.3.8 Bail information must be passed by the custody manager to the Daily Management Meeting (DMM) to review the previous twenty-four hours and look ahead at who is due to return.

- 2.3.9 Where a suspect has not had their bail altered or cancelled and fails without reasonable excuse to answer their bail, every effort should be made to ensure that they are charged with 'failing to answer police bail'. An example of credible written evidence that may constitute a reasonable excuse could be a doctor's certificate.
- 2.3.10 The OIC must ensure that the Divisional Intelligence Unit is updated when a person on bail with conditions has those conditions varied. This will ensure that the briefing and tasking database is kept up to date.
- 2.3.11 If police bail is altered by a change of bail conditions, date of return or cancellation, the OIC must notify the victim of that change as soon as possible and, in any case, within twenty-four hours, and update the Crime File to that effect.
- 2.3.12 The OIC must ensure that where the detainee does not read English, they understand that their police bail has been altered by a change of bail conditions, date of return or cancellation.
- 2.3.13 Where there is a breach of bail conditions and arrest attempts are unsuccessful, the OIC must be notified. The OIC is then responsible for informing the CPS or the court of the breach, prior to or on the day that their suspect is due in court for the original offence.
- 2.3.14 Where enquiries are concluded ahead of schedule, consideration should be given to bringing bail dates forward to progress the enquiry.

3. Procedure To Be Followed on Return of Detainee

- 3.1 OICs are responsible for making every effort to ensure that they are available on the return dates of their suspects and for advising their supervisor of any bail returns they have. If, for any reason, the OIC is unable to deal with the person when they answer bail, they should arrange for another officer to deal on their behalf rather than re-bail. A re-bail in these circumstances will only be granted in exceptional circumstances.

4. Associated Procedures

- 4.1 These procedures should be read in conjunction with *CJS (2005) The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime*, which sets out the obligations of the police in relation to arrest and bail and updating victims.
- 4.2 The Cambridgeshire Criminal Justice Board Premium Service Protocol supports the principle of PPOs being granted priority in setting bail dates back to custody.

Appendix A


CONFLICT RESOLUTION POLICY.

This policy recognises that the partner agencies may disagree as to the final outcome of a case. This procedure outlines the steps to be taken to ensure that conflicts are resolved to the benefit of each agency and learning outcomes are achieved.

In the event of disagreement between the duty prosecutor and the officer in the case over a charging decision the following action should be taken:

- 1 If, after discussions between the OIC, gatekeeper and duty prosecutor no agreement is reached, the gatekeeper should refer the matter to the BCU Crime Manager. If the Crime Manager is of the view that the case decision taken by the Duty Prosecutor should be appealed, they should refer the case to the CPS unit head or their appointed deputy. The gatekeeper should notify the Duty Prosecutor of the intention to invoke the Conflict Resolution policy.
- 2 The Divisional Crime Manager and the CPS unit head or their appointed deputy will then discuss the decision. If the dispute is resolved, the gatekeeper, officer in the case and duty prosecutor should be notified of the decision by the Crime Manager and the unit head. If no resolution can be reached, the case should then be referred to the Divisional Commander and the Chief Crown Prosecutor.
- 3 The Chief Crown Prosecutor and the Divisional Commander will consider the case and will seek to resolve the conflict. Each, in turn, will notify those concerned within their own organisation of the final outcome.
- 4 If the OIC disagrees with a decision taken by CPS Direct, then they should refer the matter to the gatekeeper and the gatekeeper should pass the matter on to the Divisional Crime Manager or their deputy. The Divisional Crime Manager should then contact CPS Direct and inform them that they wish to appeal the decision and ask for it to be put forward to the appropriate CPS Direct Unit Head.
- 5 Officers should not ignore CPS decisions if they are in disagreement with their own. Proceeding against a CPS decision could amount to an offence and a breach of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers and leave the Chief Officer of Police open to civil liabilities. It is, therefore, very important to use the conflict resolution policy in all cases which are subject to dispute.

Appendix B



APPENDIX 11

VOLUME CRIME

MANAGEMENT CHECKLIST

VOLUME CRIME MANAGEMENT CHECKLIST

This list is intended to be used by BCU commanders and managers as a self-diagnostic healthcheck regarding volume crime practices. It is consistent with the HMIC inspection framework and has been 'road tested' by a number of BCUs. Some questions are expected to be amended so that they are consistent with the specific make-up of a BCU and the period of time to be monitored.

Question	Response	Reality Check
Strategic Management (including NIM)		
Who is responsible for monitoring volume crime performance targets on the BCU?		
Do BCU plans identify appropriate priorities for crime investigation and reduction with SMART and stretching targets?		
Are volume crime priorities determined through NIM processes?		
What dedicated proactive capability does the BCU have?		
Is there a process for disseminating good practice, effective tactics etc throughout the BCU?		
Is crime investigation and reduction activity driven effectively by TCG processes?		
Who chairs the TCG meetings and who attends each meeting?		
Are other agencies involved in TCG meetings?		
How are PCSOs, Street Wardens, Special Constables used to tackle volume crime?		
How are level 2 matters identified and progressed?		

Question	Response	Reality Check
Are there initiatives with local partners aimed at crime reduction and target hardening?		
What crime reduction awareness campaigns have been run on the BCU in the past six months?		
How is the BCU represented in CDRP meetings?		
Call Handling		
What are the deployment policies for volume crime?		
Does call taking involve initial investigation?		
Do call takers have access to aides-memoire (eg, drop-down menus)?		
Do call takers advise callers regarding scene preservation?		
Are call-handling staff made aware of BCU volume crime initiatives?		
How are call-handling staff engaged in the processes of reducing and detecting volume crime?		
Do call-handling Performance Indicators reflect the evidence gathering and advice giving aspects of the role?		
Primary Investigation/Crime Recording		
Who initially attends the scene of volume crimes?		
Is their role to conduct a primary investigation?		
Are there minimum standards for primary investigation?		
Who is responsible for ensuring that these minimum standards are adhered to?		
Who monitors the quality of the crime reports, including the MO?		
Are those conducting primary investigations aware of opportunities to gather forensic evidence?		
Do the officers who attend scenes consult the SOCO attending the same scene?		
Do officers attending the scenes of crimes provide security advice?		

Question	Response	Reality Check
Crime Management		
Does a screening policy exist?		
Does the allocation of crimes for secondary investigation include investigation plans?		
Are crimes allocated on the basis of solvability?		
Are telephone investigators used?		
How does the BCU manage CCTV product in order to obtain best evidence?		
How are Homewatch/Neighbourhood Watch schemes updated?		
Are other 'watch' schemes, eg, Truckwatch, Farmwatch, updated accordingly?		
Does the BCU liaise closely with Victim Support?		
Is there a victim update policy?		
Does the BCU have the capability to conduct 'quick-time' research of volume crimes prior to allocation?		
Is volume crime the subject of analysis to establish trends, targets and fast-track actions?		
Secondary Investigation		
Who are secondary investigations allocated to?		
Are investigation plans part of the allocation process?		
Who ensures that the investigation plans are adhered to?		
Is there a policy as to the maximum number of investigations per officer?		
Are there specific target completion dates for each investigation based on the circumstances and complexities?		
Who has responsibility for finalising investigations?		
Do the investigating officers consult with those who attended the scene initially (including SOCOs)?		
How are investigations allocated, managed and supervised?		

Question	Response	Reality Check
Suspect Management		
Are there Evidence Review Officers (ERO) in place to review evidence and advise officers?		
What is the policy regarding ERO referral?		
When are EROs available?		
How do TIC policies support the investigation and reduction of volume crime?		
Is there a policy to exploit detection opportunities from all detainees?		
Is there a policy regarding officer contact with the CPS to discuss charges and bail in accordance with statutory charging?		
Who interviews suspects?		
Are Target Profiles or Crime Profiles put together by the Intelligence Unit prior to interviews taking place?		
Is there a capability to conduct financial investigations in accordance with the Proceeds of Crime Act?		
How are Criminal Justice Interventions Programme (Drug Testing), Arrest Referral Workers and/or Prolific or Persistent Offender initiatives part of the BCU response to reducing and detecting volume crime?		
Forensic Issues		
Are SOCOs based on the BCU?		
Are SOCOs deployed in accordance with the BCU T&CG?		
Do SOCOs have a scene attendance policy?		
Do SOCOs contact the victim to discuss crime scene preservation?		
What percentage of crime scenes visited by SOCOs resulted in forensic evidence being gathered?		
Do the SOCOs liaise with the investigators?		
Does the SOCO team leader attend daily NIM T&CG meetings?		

Question	Response	Reality Check
Fingerprint hits – how and who are they allocated to?		
Who checks that fingerprint hits are being dealt with effectively?		
When a hit is achieved, how are other offences identified?		
DNA intelligence hits – how and who are they allocated to?		
Who checks that the hits are being dealt with effectively?		
When a hit is achieved, how are other offences identified?		
Covert Policing and Intelligence		
What percentage of CHIS are currently targeted at volume crime?		
Are CHIS tasked to obtain information regarding the disposal of stolen property?		
What use is made of technical surveillance regarding volume crime?		
How has ANPR been exploited to combat volume crime (in accordance with T&CG process)?		
Is the BCU making use of the National Mobile Phone Crime Unit?		
Are staff aware of volume crime prolific and persistent offenders?		
Are staff tasked to gain intelligence in relation to volume crime?		
What percentage of surveillance authorities relate to volume crime?		
Crime Reduction		
How is the media used to promote crime reduction awareness?		
How is the media used to promote arrests and sentencing of target offenders?		
Are ASBOs used post sentence?		
What offender disruption tactics are being employed?		
How are ACPO schemes Safer Car Parking and Secured by Design, promoted by the BCU?		

Question	Response	Reality Check
Policing of the Second-Hand Goods Market		
How many second-hand goods shops in the BCU?		
How are these policed?		
How many motor salvage operators in the BCU?		
Does the BCU have a SPOC to deal with motor salvage?		
Are there any crime reduction initiatives taking place regarding the buying and selling of suspected stolen goods?		
Are offenders interviewed about the disposal of stolen goods?		
Is any analysis conducted in relation to the stolen goods market?		
Performance Indicators		
Is the force NIM compliant		
Is the force NCRS compliant?		
Is the force PNC compliant?		
Domestic burglary per 1000 households?		
Violent crime per 1000 population?		
Robbery per 1000 population?		
Vehicle crime per 1000 population?		
Percentage of domestic burglary detected?		
Percentage of violent crime detected?		
Percentage of robberies detected?		
Percentage of vehicle crime detected?		

APPENDIX 12

PERFORMANCE REVIEW

TEMPLATE

PERFORMANCE REVIEW TEMPLATE

This is the template used by a VCMM pilot BCU. The crime manager controlled the process by determining which crimes would be audited by all inspectors having line management responsibility for operational officers.

CRIME and CUSTODY AUDITS

Month: Crime No: Custody Ref:

Offence:

Team: Inspector: OIC:

Forensic Opportunities

SOCO appropriate?

Requested:

Scene preserved?

All Scenes Established:

All forensic opportunities exploited?

Witness Opportunities

Research of linked vehicles satisfactory?

Research of offender description satisfactory?

ID opportunities, including showing photographs, exploited?

Intelligence logs reveals further witnesses/suspects/vehicles?

House-to-house completed?

Any discrepancy in account from either complainant or witness from initial report of OIC?

Admissions – Please fill in where named suspects

Planning and preparation satisfactory?

Points to prove satisfactory?

Alibi enquiries conducted?

ERO prisoner handling template completed?

Special Warning appropriately used?

Compliance with statutory charging scheme?

General Comments/Resume For SMT

Please advise specifically in relation to areas of unsatisfactory performance, including actions taken with OIC and supervisors.

APPENDIX 13

ANALYSIS OF POLICING AND COMMUNITY SAFETY (APACS)

ANALYSIS OF POLICING AND COMMUNITY SAFETY (APACS)

The Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) framework is a performance measurement framework. It was introduced in April 2008 as Assessments of Policing and Community Safety but was subsequently renamed to reflect changes outlined in the Policing Green Paper. It applies to all police forces in England and Wales, covering key services delivered by the police working on their own or in partnership with others.

APACS is now the framework which ensures there is a common approach to understanding performance in policing and community safety. It was developed to be closely aligned with cross-government strategic priorities and external frameworks, in particular the public service agreements (PSAs) and National Indicator Set for local government in England.

The Statutory Performance Indicators for Policing and Community Safety 2009/10 are particularly relevant. They include:

- Satisfaction with service delivery (Police);
- Satisfaction with service delivery (CJS);
- Serious acquisitive crime rate;
- Serious acquisitive offences brought to justice;
- Prolific and Other Priority Offender reoffending rate.

APPENDIX 14

GUIDE TO ACCESSING THE ACPO ACQUISITIVE AND VOLUME CRIME WEBSITE

GUIDE TO ACCESSING THE ACPO ACQUISITIVE AND VOLUME CRIME WEBSITE

There are a number of ways to access the site on Genesis.


Via a Web Link

The site can be accessed directly by clicking on the link below:

<http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk/genesis/Rooms/DisplayPages/LayoutInitial?Container=com.webridge.entity.Entity%5B0ID%5B019BF5D20FD43D48A6E5484BBE890DB4%5D%5D>

Via the list of Genesis Sites

1. Go to the Genesis website at <http://www.genesis.pnn.police.uk>
2. Select ACPO/NPIA Projects and Workstreams



3. Select ACPO Acquisitive & Volume Crime site from the list of available sites

