Transcript
Voiceover: “In March 2003 a US-led coalition invaded Iraq. They deposed Saddam Hussein within a matter of weeks, but the country was about to descend into chaos. What started as an insurgency would soon turn into an all out sectarian civil war, one that would take the lives of hundreds of Iraqis every day. But it didn't have to be this way.
The violence in Iraq was not inevitable; it was caused by a myriad of mistakes. So why did the Iraqi people turn against the coalition? What caused the civil war? And where did coalition forces actually succeed? Well, using objects film and photography from the IWM collection, we'll take an in-depth look at the coalition occupation from 2003 to 2011 in an effort to understand what went wrong in Iraq.
Iraqi society at its most basic level was made up of two main religious groups. The largest were Shia Arabs largely concentrated in the south of the country. The other were Sunni Arabs who lived primarily in the east of the country, while the major urban centres around Baghdad were a mix of both. Saddam's regime was nominally secular, but in reality was dominated by the Sunni minority. His Baath party controlled almost every aspect of public life and had been suppressing ethnic and religious extremism for decades. When it fell a seismic void was left in its wake. Soon public order fell apart with the widespread looting of public buildings. The Coalition Provisional Authority which assumed control in Iraq after the invasion was totally unprepared.”
Jack Gelsthorpe, IWM Curator: “In May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority made two immediate decrees that had huge consequences for the coalition forces and the Iraqi people. The first order was to remove the top four tiers of the Baath party from public positions and ban them from future employment within the public sector. While this may have removed key members loyal to Saddam Hussein, many only held Baath party memberships to keep their jobs. In removing tens of thousands of people from public positions in key areas such as healthcare, energy, transport, security, education and sanitation, it made stabilisation and reconstruction plans immediately more difficult.
The second order was to disband the Iraqi security infrastructure created under the old regime. Approximately 500,000 people within the Iraqi armed forces, security forces and intelligence services were dismissed from their jobs. Effectively this created potentially hundreds of thousands of individuals who felt let down, humiliated and hostile to the coalition, many with military training. It also meant that the security infrastructure in Iraq would have to be completely rebuilt from the ground up.
Both orders prohibited any immediate progress in maintaining essential services and law and order in Iraq. They were also a key factor as to the growing frustration and anger within the country towards the coalition.”
Voiceover: “The fallout from these orders was compounded by the creation of a new Iraqi Governing Council which had a Shia majority. Sunnis became increasingly worried that they would have no power in a future Iraq and that Shias may seek revenge for the repression they had suffered under Saddam. Sunni insurgency groups quickly emerged; some former Baathist, some tribal and others Islamist extremists, all of which received a steady stream of money, arms and volunteers from across the Syrian border.
The coalition fought them successfully from the start of the invasion in 2003. In July, Saddam's sons Uday and Qusay were killed in a firefight in Mosul, while in December, coalition forces finally captured Saddam himself near his hometown of Tikrit. This was a moment of euphoria for the coalition who believed they were finally turning a corner in Iraq. But the war was about to turn against them.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “In April 2004 reports emerged of abuses and human rights violations committed by members of the US military against Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. Photographs showing some of the abuses were made public causing widespread outrage. It led to the conviction of 11 US soldiers. The news from Abu Ghraib was dominant throughout Iraq and neighbouring countries and it caused many to mistrust or reject the coalition and even gave some the justification to take up arms against them.
This negative perception was further compounded by coalition forces not being able to find any weapons of mass destruction. These nuclear biological and chemical protective gloves were issued to a member of the Iraq Survey Group whose role was to search for weapons of mass destruction post invasion in 2004. No such weapons were found and they remain unused and still in their original packaging.”
Voiceover: “This political element was vital. The coalition had invaded Iraq with a tiny force numbering around 170,000 troops. While this was enough to defeat the Iraqi military it was nowhere near enough to occupy the country. According to the US Army, "Twenty counterinsurgents per 1,000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations." But in 2003, Iraq’s population was around 25 million, meaning that at least 500,000 troops would have been required to secure the country; a number that was politically impossible to provide. As a result, insurgents and militia began to grow in the gaps between sparse coalition forces.
Economic problems developed too. Though GDP had recovered from the invasion in 2003, power cuts were frequent and inflation hit 32% in 2004. Iraqi civilians including the Shia majority were growing more and more discontented.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “While there was a generally positive response across the Shia population of Iraq to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, that didn't mean that they were happy with coalition forces remaining in the country. Throughout 2003 there was a growing discontent with the coalition forces and lack of progress with regards to reinstating basic services, improving the country and providing a clear and quick pathway to elections. Shia militias were starting to form and expand, one of them being the Jaish Al-Mahdi who would come to be known as the Mahdi Army. Coalition forces now had the challenge of facing not only violence from Sunni groups, but also Shia ones as well.”
Voiceover: “In 2004 Iraq exploded into violence. Sunni and Shia guerilla forces began simultaneous uprisings, taking control of several major cities. Suddenly engaged on two fronts only the last minute redeployment of the US 1st Armoured Division, which had been scheduled to leave the country, saved the coalition from a major defeat. The uprisings confirmed the coalition's belief that it was their presence causing the violence. They wanted out as soon as possible. The CPA handed over to a new Iraqi Interim Government, with the first elections scheduled for January 2005. However, before voting could take place coalition forces would have to eliminate in Insurgent sanctuaries in key cities. Some of the heaviest fighting of the war was about to take place.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “On the 7th of November, US forces led a six-week offensive in Fallujah, a city with a population of approximately 300,000 people. The house-to-house fighting was intense and dangerous not just for the combatants but also civilians who had not been able to evacuate the city in advance. Approximately 4,500 well-entrenched insurgents fought 18,000 US troops within the city. By the end of the offensive US forces had swept the city and leaders were generally confident that the elections in the new year could take place, yet the Insurgency was not defeated. The town of Fallujah was devastated. Houses, infrastructure, public and religious buildings were extensively damaged. The residents who survived the battle now lived amongst the rubble and destruction. Four months after the operation, only 30% of the city's population had returned.”
Voiceover: “The elections took place successfully, but they were not the unifying event that the coalition had hoped for. Sunnis largely boycotted the vote. In Anbar, a majority Sunni province in the east of Iraq, turnout was just 2% compared to 58% overall. As a result, the new Iraqi constitution ratified in October would have little Sunni input.
Over this period Iraq's insurgent and militia groups began to change. Realising they could did not go toe-to-toe with the coalition, the Mahdi Army allied itself with the Iran-backed Badr Corps. The Iranians provided training, weapons and expertise particularly in the field of IEDs or improvised explosive devices. Meanwhile, Sunni insurgents were transforming too. They had taken heavy losses in 2004 and as a result former Baathist groups began to fade into the background in favour of Islamist extremist groups like Musab al-Zarqawi's newly renamed named Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi soon became Iraq's most notorious insurgent. He led a brutal bombing campaign against Shias in the hopes of igniting a civil war; soon he would get his wish.
In December 2005 new elections were held. This time Sunnis came out to vote and turnout reached 75%, however, the voting largely mirrored the demography of Iraq as people voted along ethnic or sectarian lines. The coalition had been relying on the elections to unify the country, instead they raised the stakes of the conflict and brought sectarian tensions to the fore. In combination with Iraq's weak government, economic issues and lack of security, the elections set the stage for the next phase of the conflict.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “On the 22nd of February, 2006, the Al-Askari Shrine was bombed in Samarra, one of the holiest sites for Shia Muslims in Iraq. The response was immediate and reprisal attacks were carried out against Sunni communities and religious sites. By the end of the day of the bombing US reports indicated that 27 mosques had been attacked in Baghdad alone and several Sunny clerics murdered. Further reprisals and revenge attacks exponentially increased over the year and civilian casualties peaked, reaching just under 30,000 in 2006.
This car was damaged in a car bomb attack on the crowded book market at Al-Mutanabbi Street in central Baghdad on the 5th of March 2007. 38 people were killed in the explosion and hundreds injured. No group ever claimed responsibility for the attack. Bombings like this were becoming more and more common throughout the country, making life in Iraq for many ordinary civilians incredibly dangerous and difficult.”
Voiceover: “Now Baghdad became the site of widespread ethnic cleansing, as Sunni and Shia alike sought to purge their neighbourhood of the other. The bodies of thousands, tortured and mutilated, were left in the street or dumped in the Tigris River. In the midst of this indiscriminate terror many Iraqi civilians came to realise that neither the coalition nor the Iraqi government could protect them. Subsequently more and more people began to side with the militias and insurgents who were starting to provide the basic function of the state themselves. Increasingly, Iraq's insurgents and militia became less concerned with fighting the coalition more concerned with fighting each other. Large parts of Iraq now fell under the control of groups like Mahdi Army and the newly formed Islamic State of Iraq.
Meanwhile, the coalition were still committed to a speedy transition. By mid-2006 Iraq had a new Prime Minister: Nuri al-Maliki. He supposedly led a Government of National Unity but his reign was dogged by claims of corruption and bias towards Shias; a perception reinforced by both the handling of Saddam's execution in December, 2006 and by the conduct of the Iraqi Security Forces which he controlled.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “The creation and training of new Iraqi Security Forces was vital for the coalition. To reduce their own troop levels they needed to ensure that there was an effective and trained force to take over. However, within Basra especially there were concerns that certain Iraqi police and security forces were compromised or infiltrated by the very militia they were supposed to be fighting against. This problem was not only felt in the southeast. There were further issues of corruption, lack of training and experience and the ISF at this stage were deemed to be not effective enough to operate without coalition support.”
Voiceover: “Unable to trust Maliki or the Iraqi security forces, the coalition's transition strategy came crumbling down. Meanwhile, 100 Iraqis were dying every day. Something would have to change and fast. In January 2007, US President George Bush announced the deployment of an additional 20,000 American troops to Iraq. This became known as 'The Surge'. The troops would be accompanied by the arrival of a new Commander: General David Petraeus who brought with him a new plan. Coalition forces were now ordered out into their communities which they were made responsible for. The focus was on security rather than transition. The number of US troops patrolling Baghdad doubled, giving them the manpower to hold on to the areas they had cleared. In addition, they also began to tackle insurgent and militia supply lines in the so-called 'Baghdad Belt' effectively cordoning off the city. But the biggest changes came far from Baghdad.
First Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province began to grow tired of ISI and their brutal tactics. In late 2006 they began to cooperate with the coalition forces that they had long opposed. This realignment became known as 'The Awakening'. With the help of these Sunni tribesmen, Anbar Province was turned from an ISI stronghold into one of the safest regions of Iraq; a trend which soon spread to Baghdad. Secondly the Shia militia movement began to fracture. The Mahdi Army soon found themselves increasingly in conflict not just with the Iraqi government but with their fellow Shia militias. The Mahdi Army had been formed to protect Shia Iraqis, but was increasingly seen as a band of violent thugs. By September, Muqtada al-Sadr was forced to freeze Mahdi Army operations in an effort to save face.
Together, the surge, awakening and freeze transformed the war in Iraq. Ethno-sectarian violence was calmed and the number of violent attacks fell by 40%. It was a huge success, but new problems soon sprouted elsewhere.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “The British at the same time were not able nor willing to increase their numbers within Basra and their zone of control. Their plan was to reduce their numbers as they were under pressure domestically and their focus was now on operations in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. The British forces had always struggled to effectively secure a large part of Iraq with a limited number of service personnel. Their zone of responsibility spanned four regions and a major city in Basra; an area roughly the size of England. By the end of 2005, it was judged that only 5% of UK military effort in the area could be devoted to counterinsurgency operations due to lack of sufficient numbers. This led to a certain amount of friction between the US and UK, as those within the US military felt that the British were motivated more by the short-term political gain of an early withdrawal rather than the long-term objective of a secure handover to the Iraqi government in the Southeast.”
Voiceover: “In September 2007 the British handed their base in Basra to the Iraqi Army. But in their absence the city soon fell under strict Maddy Army rule. In response, Maliki was forced to launch an all-out attack in March 2008 both in Basra and Sadr City in the north of Baghdad. Once again, Iraqi Security Forces were found wanting and it was the coalition who did much of the damage. But either way the Mahdi Army was routed. By the end of 2008, Iraq's trajectory had entirely changed. Sunni insurgents had either switched sides or fled north and Shia militias had been defeated. Inflation was at just 2% and for the first time the Iraqi government was in control of almost the entire country. But despite their success over the past 2 years the coalition presence in Iraq was now being called into question.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “By 2007 public opinion in both the UK and US had completely turned against Iraq War. The constant scenes of violence and chaos within the country, combined with the increase in coalition casualties, meant that many people wanted coalition forces out of Iraq. This is a Snatch Land Rover that was used in Iraq by British forces as a patrol vehicle. The lightly armoured vehicle, originally designed for operations in Northern Ireland, was vulnerable to improvised explosive devices, a weapon widely used by insurgents and militia. 27 British Service Personnel were killed in Snatch Land Rovers while serving in Iraq. In 2017, the UK Ministry of Defense apologised to families of Service Personnel killed in Snatch Land Rovers after a long legal process and stark criticisms as part of the findings published in the Iraq inquiry of 2016.”
Voiceover: “In one of his last acts as president, George Bush agreed a deadline for the American withdrawal from Iraq. Set for the 31st of December 2011 the date would loom over the rest of the conflict. In 2009, US troops largely withdrew from Iraqi cities leaving Iraqi Security Forces in charge and by the middle of the year, Americans were the only foreign combat troops left in Iraq, with their numbers falling precipitously. The Maliki Government continued to survive but only just. The global recession and a collapse in oil prices caused major problems at the 2010 elections. Maliki remained in power, but his reign would become increasingly corrupt and authoritarian, creating new discontent within Iraq. When the next crisis came, the coalition would not be there to support him.”
Jack Gelsthorpe: “By the US withdrawal in 2011 Iraq had, on the face of it, a working government, security forces and civil service. However, this stability was an illusion. Society was still fractured in many ways, resentments and suspicions still existed and there would be further devastating consequences to come a few years later with the emergence of ISIS. For the coalition, the spectre of the war and its aftermath would loom over foreign policy decisions for many years. Iraqi civilians were the most affected by the invasion, millions of people were displaced. It is hard to identify a clear number of how many civilians died after the invasion and the instability and crises that followed. Documented civilian deaths from violence number up to approximately 210,000, but many argue it is considerably more than this. The impact of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the violence and chaos that followed is still being felt today.”
