Screening People and Their Belongings

Introduction

Establishing a Screening Strategy

A robust assessment of the risk to the organisation and site will help define the specific threat items that the screening process will need to detect in order for their ingress to be prevented. This may include threat items such as explosive devices, firearms and other weapons, but may also include other items such as electronic devices or protest materials. The list of target items is likely to contain some which are considered essential to detect, some that it is desirable to detect, and other items that are of interest but failure to detect can be tolerated.

Consideration should be given to the different groups of individuals entering the premises such as staff, visitors, contractors, or the public, and any different types of items they may wish to bring in. It may be considered appropriate, given differing risk profiles, for some individuals (for example visitors as opposed to credentialed staff), or different sizes or types of bags, to undergo different screening regimes.

The operational requirement for the screening process will be informed by the risk assessment and should consider factors such as the desired throughput or flow of individuals and their belongings, space constraints and location (including consideration of possible queues), and integration with other security measures.

Methods for Screening People and their Belongings

For some applications a screening approach that is largely or completely manual may be sufficient to meet the needs of the organisation. Only where it has been established that technology will add real value to screening processes should its use be considered. Whilst use of technology can add significant value in certain scenarios it can be expensive to purchase, take up a large amount of space and require considerable on-going investment for it to remain effective. Factors such as equipment maintenance and provision of on-going staff training should not be overlooked. No screening process, either manual or involving technology, can be effective without suitably trained and motivated members of staff.

If it has been deemed appropriate to use technology for the screening of individuals and their belongings, the equipment employed must be carefully selected as there is a wide range of technologies available which can offer very different capabilities. It may be necessary to employ a combination of methods or technologies to cover the full range of threat items, especially if simultaneous screening of people and their belongings is required.

With any screening approach that is adopted it is important to ensure that the process is specified and delivered in a way that addresses, and is proportionate to, the particular risks the site faces. All screening processes have limitations; these need to be properly understood, accepted and if necessary mitigated against. Recommendations for screening people and their belongings given here should be seen as just one element of a wider security strategy.

A selection of commonly used options for screening people and their belongings is set out in the guidance below.

High Footfall Screening

High footfall locations encompass a wide variety of different venues and events with different detection priorities, different visitor arrival rates, and differences in the possessions visitors bring. NPSA recommends that venues adapt their screening solutions for venue and event specific requirements. 

For locations with high footfall, this can mean that security check points are adaptable and able to discriminate larger threats from benign items (i.e. everyday items carried on a person or in their bags). This gives the capability to screen large numbers of people and/or their belongings without them needing to slow down significantly or remove pocket contents etc. 

High Footfall Screening video

Test Methods

One area of emerging detection capability is High Footfall Screening, which aims to use technologies that can quickly and effectively discriminate items that represent a significant threat from those that do not. To support the understanding and adoption of these products, NPSA has developed a suite of test methods which provides a means to evaluate, test and compare different systems.

 The test methods are technology agnostic and are designed to be conducted by product manufacturers (or their appointed testing contractors) without NPSA’s involvement.  They are intended to assist:

• product manufacturers in communicating their systems’ capability to detect various categories of threat, as well as anticipated nuisance alarm rates for various categories of typically carried items (pocket contents, electronic devices, bags, etc).
• site owners and operators (and security service providers) in determining what high footfall screening product(s) (and settings) best meet their requirements.

Good Practice in Search and Screening

For venues where consent to search is a condition of entry, good practice in search and screening includes:

• Documenting the justification for search, on grounds of threat and risk (i.e. appropriate and proportionate). 
  
  • This should include any technologies and techniques being used. 
• Having appropriate policies and procedures in place and ensuring staff are suitably trained, competent and confident in applying them.
• Ensuring that the security workforce has a suitable balance of males and females to accommodate searches needing to be conducted.
• Fully explaining the search process and positively seeking consent before any search starts.
  
  • The explanation should include the fact that refusal of consent can be considered grounds to refuse entry.
• Making reasonable adjustments to account for individual’s protected characteristics (visitor’s and staff), such as potentially;
  
  • Having a space for searches to be conducted discreetly (i.e. out of public view) if requested on grounds of e.g. religious belief, medical need.
• For manual person searches, these should typically be carried out by a security officer of the same biological sex as the individual being searched. 
  
  • However, applicable policies should specifically address potential alternatives arrangements – for example, where an individual requests that an officer of their lived gender, rather than biological sex, carry out a search. These policies should be reviewed by internal legal teams to ensure compliance with the law. 
• At least one other person (agreeable to the person being searched) should be present in the search area.

The responsibility for carrying out lawful searches lies with the site, and any third party security contractors. The guidance above does not constitute legal advice, and it is the responsibility of the site to ensure that there are adequate policies and procedures in place, and staff (or third party contractors) are trained on how to carry out searches effectively, whilst maintaining the dignity and ensuring consent of the individual being searched. 

Further information

NPSA has been a major contributor of technical content to BSi PAS 127:2014 Checkpoint Security Screening of People and their Belongings - Guide, which aims to provide comprehensive guidance to security managers and contractors on the specification, design and delivery of checkpoint screening processes. PAS 127:2014 may be purchased from BSi.

The Introduction to PAS 127:2014 gives a summary of the PAS 127 process and highlights some of the key information provided in the PAS.