



# High Street Hospitality: Protective Security Considerations

This supplementary updated guidance is intended for Authorities who are considering temporarily increasing or expanding pedestrianised spaces to assist businesses with COVID-19 social distancing measures and the revitalisation of high streets.

## THREAT

The threat to the UK from terrorism is

**SUBSTANTIAL. A Vehicle As a Weapon attack remains a realistic possibility,**

amongst other forms of attack, such as a Marauding Terrorist Attack or an Improvised Explosive Device. Vehicles are widely available and easy to use. Consequently, driving a vehicle into crowds of people is a common attack method compared to more complex alternatives.



## OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES

The **threats we face and the way they manifest themselves** are broad and sometimes complex.

Mitigating them effectively requires a holistic approach where multiple protective security disciplines come together. Marginal adjustments or enhancements to existing measures can collectively have a significant benefit.

This document brings together some key pieces of guidance to counter Vehicle As a Weapon attack, that are quick, practical and achievable to deliver, and in doing so help protect against other threats. The suite of options available in this and other guidance will help Authorities select risk based measures that also help kickstart the high street recovery.

## RISK OWNERSHIP



Risk owners and other key stakeholders should work together to develop a shared understanding of threats and of their needs (e.g. residential, business and local authority activity). This will help to develop a proportionate risk based mitigation strategy.

## SECURITY IS AN ENABLER

Over and above its intended purpose, visible and effective operational and physical security can provide a number of additional benefits, for example:

- Helps reduce anti-social behaviour
- Improves safety, reduces noise and pollution
- Provides peace of mind to people and businesses

## FURTHER FREE RESOURCES

**Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs)** can help you to better understand the benefits, and any issues associated with, protective security measures on the high street.

Useful risk based guidance can be found at:

- [NPSA's website](#)
- [Managing security risks throughout COVID-19](#)
- [NaCTSO's website](#)

## KEY STEPS

- ☒ Engage with your local Police CTSA
- ☒ Identify & engage with risk owners & key stakeholders, including local businesses
- ☒ Undertake a Threat Vulnerability Risk Assessment, identifying the key threats of concern; e.g. *Vehicle As a Weapon, Marauding Terrorist Attack, Improvised Explosive Attack as well as other crime and anti-social behaviour issues*
- ☒ Prioritise locations to protect
- ☒ Agree a layered mitigations strategy
- ☒ Conduct vulnerability survey(s)
- ☒ Factor in business operations & other needs
- ☒ Deploy operational and physical mitigation
- ☒ Manage and monitor



# Layered Security

Additional measures can further protect your High Street

**ACT**ACTION  
COUNTERS  
TERRORISM

## DISRUPTING HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE

An individual or group may identify a high street as a potential target, and in doing so they will want to obtain current, reliable and credible information by conducting [hostile reconnaissance](#) to inform their attack planning.



[Eyes Wide Open](#) is a short video on this information gathering and the importance of your response.

Authorities should seek to work with local businesses to **deny** the potential hostile access to information and facilities that help them to understand vulnerabilities. Collectively you should also seek to **detect and respond quickly to suspicious behaviour**.

**Authorities and businesses employ a very broad range of staff and contractors**, many of whom will know and spend much time in your town / city centre and high streets. **They are a security asset** so ensure that they are [vigilant](#) and responsive to, for example, suspicious or aggressive activity, abandoned bags or attempts at concealing devices or weapons in bins, planters or hidden in or behind other street furniture etc.



Working with the local community, businesses and Police, [Project SERVATOR](#) helps disrupt a range of criminal activity, including terrorism, while providing a reassuring presence for the public.

The [ACT e-learning package](#) provides a good introduction on how to respond to suspicious activity. [See, Check and Notify \(SCaN\)](#) training is available to staff at all levels, is free, and can be delivered locally by your CTSA.



The posture of security staff is critical in the perception a hostile will build of your high street and its businesses, so you should review the [Professionalising Security](#) pages to find out more about the important role your security can play in deterring hostile reconnaissance.

## EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS

The response provided by the emergency services to a terrorist attack will be dynamic, coordinated and scalable and may rapidly involve a significant deployment of emergency services resources. [Working with and understanding how key partners will respond](#) will assist in organisational planning and preparation.





# Layered Security

Additional measures can further protect your High Street

# ACT

ACTION  
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## TEMPORARY VEHICLE SECURITY BARRIER OPTIONS

NPSA recommend that a barrier deployed for the **purposes of countering terrorism to protect people** against **vehicle-borne threats** should be a 'Rated Vehicle Security Barrier' that has undergone [formal vehicle impact testing to recognised standards](#) – please refer to the [NPSA Catalogue of Security Equipment](#). These barriers provide the **greatest level of protection against Vehicle As a Weapon attack**.



The **HVM schemes illustrated overleaf** show the level of protection achievable with a deployment of rated temporary Vehicle Security Barriers.



This document complements NPSA's guidance on [Protecting Queues from Vehicle As a Weapon Attack](#).

Temporary barriers may move under impact and some may allow the vehicle to penetrate into the protected area; consider this when [selecting and deploying](#) them.

*A wide range of temporary vehicle security barriers can be **purchased or leased** from a number of **UK suppliers**.*

*When deploying barriers, make sure there are **safe dispersal routes for people**.*

Do **NOT** remove any security features or useful street furniture items without considering protective security in the round.

The following barriers may be considered but carry significantly more risk:

- The presence of street furniture (e.g. bus stops, signage posts, seating, telephone boxes, including trees) should be viewed as an opportunity to offer some protection.
- The bigger, heavier and more robust the street furniture is, the more resistance it will offer. Vehicles impacting this type of barrier will create noise and should help alert people to danger.
- Where the above measures cannot be deployed, barriers that are clearly visible and provide a demarcation will be essential.

If deployed barriers restrict traffic for counter terrorism reasons (Scheme Options 1 and 2 on page 4), your [local Police CTSA](#) can advise on the necessary Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order (ATTRO).



Traffic signage should conform to the Department for Transport's *The Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016*. Adequate lighting should illuminate the deployment location so that pedestrians and road users can see the barriers and signage.

## RSES

Register of Security  
Engineers & Specialists

Additional assistance can be sought from specialist members of the [Register of Security Engineers and Specialists](#). Advice on [procuring specialist security consultants](#) is also available.



# Risk Based Physical Protection Options




National Protective Security Authority

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ACTION  
COUNTERS  
TERRORISM

The 5 schemes illustrated carry different residual security risks.

Temporary Vehicle Security Barriers are deployed in different layouts depending on the scheme.




1

LOWER  
RISK

## ROAD CLOSURE: TOTAL TRAFFIC EXCLUSION


Full pedestrianisation  
Pedestrian safety is maximised  
No operational overhead  
No access for emergency services, deliveries & maintenance vehicles



2

## MANAGED ROAD CLOSURE


Balancing business & residential needs  
Scheduled full pedestrianisation  
Pedestrian safety is managed  
Operational overhead  
Timed or controlled vehicle access



3

## WIDENED FOOTWAY PROTECTION


Balancing business & residential needs  
Increased pedestrianisation  
Pedestrian safety preserved/improved  
Reduced highway width  
Full or restricted vehicle access



4

## PARTITIONED HIGH STREET

Balancing business & residential needs  
Pockets of pedestrianisation  
Pockets of safer pedestrian areas  
Reduced highway width & access  
Layout reduces vehicle speeds



5

HIGHER  
RISK

## DO NOTHING

No physical protection from vehicles


# Scheme Considerations

Additional measures may influence your decision

**ACT** ACTION  
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TERRORISM

## SAFETY

Assess the projected/known pedestrian footfall to ensure the barriers are placed to maintain safe levels of pedestrian density and flow during peak periods and emergency evacuation. Restricting vehicular access will also affect emergency services access; consider this in your planning.



## ROAD CLOSURE: TOTAL TRAFFIC EXCLUSION

Consider how the High Street will function for vehicles in different scenarios and put contingency plans in place:

- ☐ impact on routine business and operations
- ☐ emergency services response
- ☐ local authority access (street cleaning etc.)



## MANAGED ROAD CLOSURE

Protects the high street during:

- ☐ peak shopping and entertainment periods
- ☐ allowing vehicle access when the crowds have reduced

Good operational security planning is required to ensure the integrity of the measures and protected area.



## WIDENED FOOTWAY PROTECTION

Install Vehicle Security Barriers on the edge of the widened footway and at the ends. Consider movement strategies:

- ☐ Pedestrian movement
- ☐ Impact on carriageway traffic (buses, cyclists and other road users)



## PARTITIONED HIGH STREET

Main principle of this scheme is to enforce traffic calming through the deployment of robust temporary Vehicle Security Barriers. In essence, preventing high speed and long straight approaches.

NPSA recommends enforcing low vehicle speeds and no greater than 20mph.

The chicanes required may:

- ☐ only facilitate one way traffic
- ☐ impede legitimate vehicles

During the design process conduct a vehicle dynamics assessment and swept path analysis.

Further advice can be sought from CTSA's.



## DO NOTHING

Is a higher risk option that maintains the status quo. It relies on existing measures (e.g. street furniture).



# Your Checklist

Prepare, implement and manage your High Street scheme

# ACT

ACTION  
COUNTERS  
TERRORISM

## PREPARATION


- ☒ **Engage** & seek advice from [local Police CTSA](#)
- ☒ **Engage** with risk owners & key stakeholders
- ☒ Identify roles & responsibilities
- ☒ Prioritise protection by conducting a Streetscape Security Risk Assessment for the streets of concern:
  - ☒ Consider the effect of greater pavement licencing, al-fresco dining and drinking, queues, outdoor entertainment and movement strategies (people, cyclists & vehicles) etc.
  - ☒ Map how the street(s) will change & look
  - ☒ Agree who needs vehicle access, when & how
  - ☒ Ensure emergency services requirements are captured
  - ☒ Define and prioritise the threats and how they may occur
  - ☒ Determine overarching vulnerabilities and potential impacts of an attack
  - ☒ Agree layered protective security strategy.  
*e.g. security guarding and patrols, staff vigilance, response & reporting training for Authority staff and local business, CCTV monitoring, vehicle security barriers.*
- ☒ Conduct a threat based **Vulnerability Assessment** of the high street
- ☒ Agree more detailed proposed mitigation measures
- ☒ Select appropriate operational and physical measures
- ☒ Agree & document residual risk

## IMPLEMENTATION

- ☒ Train and inform
- ☒ Supervise deployment of measures
- ☒ Sign-off

## MANAGEMENT

- ☒ Regular site inspections (condition, safety and security risks)
- ☒ Review & update mitigations as the situation changes



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